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NOTES
ESCAPING THE DEAD HAND OF THE PAST:
THE NEED FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991' ("the CRA" or "the 1991
Act") in response to three years of Supreme Court decisions that curtailed
protections available to victims of employment discrimination. 2 Between 1989 and
1991, the Supreme Court issued no less than seven decisions that restricted the
legal framework that the Court had previously championed to enforce civil rights
laws.3 Through these decisions, it became clear to many members of Congress
4
and to civil rights groups5 that the Court was giving up its leadership role in
ensuring equal protection. In response to the Court's rejection of its previous
commitment to civil rights enforcement, Justice Blackmun remarked in one
dissent: "One wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination
- or more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a problem in our
society, or even remembers that it ever was.' '6 President Bush agreed with
Congress that there needed to be a legislative remedy for the Supreme Court
decisions narrowing protection for minorities. 7
Congress drafted the 1991 Act to restore the legal landscape for victims of
employment discrimination. In addition to overruling at least seven recent Su-
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(Supp. III 1992).
2. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2 (1990) (an early amendment provided, "It is the purpose of this Act to - (1) respond to
the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically
limited by those decisions .... ). See generally H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
14-114 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 549-652; H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 1-42 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-735 (noting that primary
purpose was to overrule several recent Supreme Court decisions).
3. West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991); Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
See infra Part I for a full discussion of these cases. In addition, the Act responded to Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989), by allowing parties who prevail in job
discrimination cases to reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defending relief obtained in original
action against subsequent challenges.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Julie Johnson, High Court Called Threat to Blacks, N.Y. TWms, July 10, 1989,
at A14 (Benjamin Hooks, executive director of NAACP, said the Court "is more dangerous to this
nation" than the segregationist foes of the civil rights movement).
6. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
7. Steven A. Holmes, Critics of Rights Law Fear A Flood of Suits Over Jobs, N.Y. TIMAs,
May 27, 1990, § I (Magazine), at 8 (Bush administration supports reversal of Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)); Maureen Dowd, Trying to Head Off His Own Veto, Bush Holds
Meeting on Rights Bill, N.Y. Truas, May 15, 1990, at Al. (Marlin Fitzwater, White House spokes-
person, said that President Bush felt there needed to be a legislative remedy for the Supreme Court
decisions narrowing protection for minorities).
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 19:223
preme Court decisions,8 the 1991 Act provides for compensatory and punitive
damages as well as jury trials under Title VII, 9 in order to provide victims of
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin the
same remedies available to victims of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
section 1981.10
The full force of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 remains unrealized. Although
the promise of more comprehensive protection exists, access to those protections
may not extend to all victims of discrimination. Congress failed to agree on
whether the CRA applies retroactively and left the issue for the courts to decide."
The issue of retroactive application of the CRA challenges courts in two situations.
First, courts must decide whether the CRA applies to pending cases filed before
the new law went into effect, whether those cases are at trial for the first time,
on appeal, or on remand. Second, federal courts must decide whether the 1991
Act applies to cases filed after November 21, 1991, the date President Bush
signed the 1991 Act into law, but which involve pre-Act discriminatory conduct.
The question of retroactive application of the 1991 Act is bewildering to
federal courts. Federal courts lack guidance on the retroactivity issue since the
Act itself does not explicitly specify whether it should be applied to pending
cases;' 2 the turbulent legislative history is inconclusive,'" and Supreme Court
precedent over retroactive statutory construction is conflicting.' 4 Due to the
equivocal and inconsistent authorities upon which federal courts must rely to
decide the issue, it is hardly surprising that federal courts are handing down
conflicting holdings. Federal district courts are split on the issue, some ruling in
favor of retroactive application, 5 and others against it.16 To date, seven federal
8. See supra notes 2-3. Section 114 of the 1991 Act also overruled Library of Congress v.
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986), by providing that federal employees are entitled to all of the remedies
available under Title VII, including interest. Section 113 responds to Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), by allowing Title VII prevailing plaintiffs to reasonable costs
for experts. The Act also responds to Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), by making proof that
a waiver of attorneys' fees was not part of settlement a condition of a court ordered or stipulated
dismissal.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (prohibiting employment discrimination on basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
10. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988)).
11. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Kennedy stating that "[ilt
will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply to cases and claims that
are pending on the date of enactment."); 137 CoNG. REc. S15,325 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (Sen.
Danforth stating legislative history is not conclusive of congressional intent).
12. See infra Part II-A.
13. See infra, Part II-B.
14. Compare Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., Inc., 488 U.S. 204 (1988), with Bradley v.
Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974). See discussion infra Part II-C.
15. E.g., Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 85-3951, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18112
(D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1992); Kent v. Howard, 801 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Cal. 1992); Bridges v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Jaekel v. Equifax Marketing Decision Sys., Inc.,
797 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Va. 1992); Sample v. Keystone Carbon Co., 786 F. Supp. 527 (W.D. Pa.
1992); Long v. Carr, 784 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Watkins v..Bessemer State Tech. College,
782 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ala. 1992); Saltarikos v. Charter Mfg. Co., 782 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Wis.
1992); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 782 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. Ala. 1992); Graham v. Bodine Elec.
Co., 782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. III. 1992); King v. Shelby Medical Ctr., 779 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ala.
1991); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I11. 1991).
16. E.g., Lannan v. Bonner, No. 91-C7555, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119 (N.D. I11. Jan. 11,
1993); Davila v. New York Hosp., No. 91-C5992, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,
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appellate courts have reached the issue.1 7 All circuits reaching the issue, with the
exception of the Ninth Circuit,' 8 have ruled against retroactivity. The Supreme
Court had denied certiorari on the retroactivity issue twice and appeared content
to leave the problem to the lower courts. 9 Following the Ninth Circuit's holding
in favor of retroactivity, however, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
to two cases which it will hear next fall.20
Although federal courts are divided on the issue, the current trend of the
courts is to deny retroactive application of the 1991 Act to cases pending when
it was enacted and to cases filed after the 1991 Act was signed into law but
involving pre-Act conduct. 2' Even when the CRA merely restores rights eradicated
by restrictive Supreme Court decisions or alters procedural rights, many courts
have refused to apply the 1991 Act retroactively. 22 Federal courts refusing to
apply the 1991 Act retroactively rarely evaluate the reliance interests of the parties
involved or even what law existed at the time the discriminatory conduct oc-
curred.21 Courts have applied the overruled Supreme Court cases to litigation
1993); Colantuoni v. Macomber, 807 F. Supp. 835 (D.D.C. 1992); Armstrong v. Medigan, No. 92-
2456, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18011 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 1992); Sofferin v. American Airlines, 785
F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Hameister v. Harley-Davidson, 785 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Wis. 1992);
Toney v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Cook v. Foster Forbes Glass, 783 F. Supp.
1217 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Maddox v. Norwood Clinic, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ala. 1992); Tyree
v. Riley, 783 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1992); Burchfield v. Derwinski, 782 F. Supp. 532 (D. Colo.
1992); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992); Hansel v. Public Serv.
Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991).
17. Baynes v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1992); Davis v. City &
County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992); Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975
F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3522 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1993) (No. 92-
1190); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61
U.S.L.W. 3424 (U.S Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-737); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv.
Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Fray v. Omaha World Herald
Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992); see also Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.
1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1992) (No. 92-977); Banas v. American
Airlines, 969 F.2d 477, 483-485 (7th Cir. 1992).
18. Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).
19. Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Inc., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnatti, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide if Anti-Bias Law Is
Retroactive, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 23, 1993, at A17.
20. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3580 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-757); Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. granted sub nom., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1993) (No. 92-939).
21. E.g., Beasley v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 92-C4008, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17934 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
20, 1992) (holding that CRA does not apply to pre-Act conduct regardless of date complaint filed);
McBride v. French Riviera Health Spa, No. 92-1641, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17774 (E.D. La. Nov.
19, 1992) (holding CRA amendments providing for compensatory and punitive damages did not apply
to case filed April 24th, 1992, where case involved pre-Act conduct); Sloan v. Boeing, Co., 802 F.
Supp. 384, 387 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that CRA does not apply to cases filed after effective date
of CRA if involved pre-Act conduct).
22. See, e.g., Gersman, 975 F.2d at 899 (holding section 101(2)(b) which overruled Patterson
did not apply retroactively although discriminatory conduct occurred prior to Patterson decision);
Holt v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 974 F.2d 771, 773-74 (6th Cir. 1992) (same), petition for
cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1992) (No. 92-980); Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186,
190 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); Vogel, 959 F.2d at 599 (applying Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)).
23. See, e.g., Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229 (applying Patterson rather than § 101(2)(b), which
overrode Patterson, to conduct preceding the decision, explaining "retroactive application carefully
tailored to situations .. . in which reliance interests are minimal would engender enormous satellite
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which arose long before those Supreme Court decisions were handed down.2 4 As
a result, federal courts are granting discriminatory employers a windfall. Federal
courts' tendency to deny application of the CRA retroactively frustrates and
delays Congress' goal in enacting the CRA to restore and broaden civil rights
protections.
This Note argues that Congress should amend the CRA to provide for
retroactive application of all its provisions, both those reversing prior Supreme
Court decisions which gave a cramped interpretation over the scope of civil rights
statutes2 and those granting Title VII plaintiffs parity with victims of racial
discrimination under section 1981 .26 This Note is divided into four parts. Part I
explains the purpose of the CRA and itt effect on civil rights litigation. Part II
discusses the debate over retroactive application of the CRA. The debate is traced
through the muddled language of the Act itself, its ambiguous legislative history,
and conflicting Supreme Court precedent on statutory construction. Part III
analyzes how federal courts have grappled with the issue. It concludes that left
with no clear directive from Congress, courts are handing down inconsistent and
often unfair decisions. Part IV examines the consequences of Congress' failure
to mandate retroactive application. Part IV also recommends that Congress enact
corrective legislation to ensure that the CRA applies retroactively to all cases that
were pending when the CRA was handed down and to all cases filed after the
date of enactment but involving prior discriminatory conduct. Only legislation
can cure the inconsistent and often unjust judicial decisions caused by Congress'
original failure to specify the proper application of the 1991 Act.
I. PURPOSE: OVERRULING THE SUPREME COURT
Congress' most important goal in enacting the 1991 Act was to erase recent
Supreme Court decisions that were hostile to civil rights plaintiffs. 27 These cases
and the amendments overturning them are summarized below.
litigation"); Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1374 (applying Patterson to conduct predating the decision
rather than § 101(2)(b) on grounds that "[a]ny other holding would require unwieldy distinctions
between classes of litigants based on the degree to which they relied on the legal regime antedating
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.").
24. E.g., Hill v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-87-3008, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17330
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992) (applying Patterson); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co.,
963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Patterson).
25. See supra note 3.
26. See supra notes 11-13. The Constitution does not prohibit retroactive law making. Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798) (holding that ex post facto clause, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 1,
applies only to criminal law). The Supreme Court has often said that if Congress disagrees with its
interpretation of federal statutes, Congress should change the law. E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) ("[Tihe legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains
free to alter what we have done.").
27. Congress stated its purpose in enacting the CRA as follows:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harass-
ment in the workplace; (2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job
related" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); (3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory
guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq); and (4) to respond to recent decisions of
the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
[Vol. 19:223
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A. Disparate Impact Suits: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
The watershed Supreme Court decision that became the catalyst behind the
enactment of the CRA was the 5-4 decision handed down by a Rehnquist majority
in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2 Through Wards Cove, the Supreme
Court reversed twenty years of legal analysis in Title VII employment discrimi-
nation cases based on disparate impact theories by overturning the seminal Title
VII case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.29 In Griggs, Chief Justice Burger, writing
for a unanimous Court, rejected the argument that Title VII cases required proof
of discriminatory intent to invalidate employment practices that exclude women
or minorities from employment.3 0 Burger stressed that plaintiffs need not prove
employers acted with discriminatory animus towards them to bring 'Title VII
suits.3 Griggs provided that once the plaintiff proves she suffered a disparate
impact, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to make the affirmative
defense that the employment practice was required by a business necessity. 2 The
Griggs decision allowed plaintiffs to vindicate their grievances where employment
practices, while neutral on their face, disproportionately excluded qualified work-
ers from opportunities on the basis of sex, national origin, race, or religion.
In Wards Cove, Justice Rehnquist dealt a body blow to the Griggs holding
by ruling that an employer must only make the weaker showing of "business
justification," not "business necessity." 33 When Justice Rehnquist articulated
exactly what was meant by "business justification," he revealed that protections
provided to victims of employment discrimination in Griggs had been stripped
away. He explained, "there is no requirement that the challenged practices be
'essential' or 'indispensable' to employer's business for it to pass muster: this
degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to meet . . .
Congress responded to the Wards Cove decision by enacting section 105 of the
CRA. 35 Section 105 codifies the Griggs holding. It provides that once a Title VII
plaintiff proves discriminatory impact, the burden of proof shifts to the employer
to show business necessity. Also, section 105 restored the pre-Wards Cove analysis
by easing the complaining party's duty to show that specific employment practices
contributed to employment discrimination.
B. Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
The 1991 Act also overruled Patterson v. McLean Credit Union .36 In that
case, the Supreme Court severely restricted the scope of section 1981 by holding
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See also, H.R. Rep. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549; H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 1-3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694-95 (primary purpose of CRA to overrule
Supreme Court decisions with which Congress disagreed).
28. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See supra note 27.
29. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
30. Id. at 432.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658-59.
34. Id. at 659.
35. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (1991).
36. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
19931
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that the statute only protected victims of discrimination in the formation of
contracts, not in the enforcement of contracts.17 Prior to the 1991 Act amend-
ments, section 1981 provided, "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . *".."38 The Supreme Court's
cramped interpretation of the scope of section 1981 was not warranted by the
explicit language of section 1981, its legislative history, or precedent. 9 The
decision severely restricted redress for victims of employment discrimination since
Title VII actions only apply to employers with more than fifteen employees.4 In
addition, at the time Patterson was handed down, Title VII did not provide for
jury trials or for compensatory and punitive damages as section 1981 did.
The CRA restored the law to its state prior to Patterson through section
101(2)(b). 41 It explicitly reinstated meaning to section 1981 by defining "make
and enforce contracts" to include "the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and
conditions of the contractual relationship. ' 42 Section 101(2)(b) restores a cause
of action under section 1981 to employees who suffer harassment, are denied
promotions, or are terminated on the basis of race.
C. Mixed Motive Cases: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
The CRA also reversed the holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.4 3 In
Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff sued her employer accounting firm for denying
her a promotion on the basis of her sex.44 Although she had brought in more
business than any of the eighty-seven men considered for partner, she was passed
over for partnership consideration. 45 Her superiors told her that her professional
problems would be solved if she dressed and acted more femininely.4 The Supreme
Court held that the employer could avoid liability altogether if the employer
demonstrated that it would have taken the same action absent the motivating
37. Id. at 185.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (emphasis added).
39. See H.R. REp. No. 102-40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 90-91 (1991), reprinted in, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 628-29 (citing cases applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to employment discrimination
occurring after hiring, e.g., Hernandez v. Hill Country Tel. Coop., Inc., 849 F.2d 139, 143-44 (5th
Cir. 1988) (discrimination in denial of promotion); Richards v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 F.
Supp. 259, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discrimination in denial of promotion), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d
Cir. 1988); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 201-03 (1st Cir. 1987) (discrimination in
training, wages, and discharge); Liotta v. National Forge, 629 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1980) (reversing
summary judgment for employer on discrimination in dismissal claim), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970
(1981); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976) (discrimination in promotion practices)); see also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221-23 ("the
Court today adds a course of bricks dramatically askew from the 'secure foundation' of the courses
laid by others, replacing a sense of rational direction and purpose in the law with an aimless
confinement to a narrow construction of what it means to 'make' a contract") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). In 1991, more than 3.7 million firms with fewer than 15 employees
existed. H.R. Rap. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 91 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 629.
41. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2)(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991).
42. Id.
43. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
44. Id. at 231-32.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 235.
1991 Civil Rights Act
discriminatory factor. 47 Section 107 reversed Price Waterhouse and provides
victims of employment discrimination compensation where they can show that
discrimination was a motivating factor even if the employment decision com-
plained of would have occurred absent the motivating factor. 41
D. Seniority Systems: Lorance v. AT&T Technologies
The CRA also reversed Lorance v. AT&T Technologies.49 In Lorance, three
plaintiffs premised their Title VII action on the theory that seniority systems
disparately impacted women and that layoffs under the system constituted un-
lawful discrimination. 50 In 1982, the plaintiffs were adversely affected for the
first time by a seniority system that was implemented in 1979."1 The Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations commenced on the date the allegedly
discriminatory seniority system was adopted and thus dismissed the suit as
untimely.5 2 Lorance barred any discrimination suits based on seniority systems
implemented before Title VII was enacted. After Lorance, challenges to discrim-
inatory seniority systems could only be brought immediately after the systems
were adopted, although many employees would not suffer discrimination and
thus gain standing until years after the systems went into effect.
Section 112 restores civil rights protections to victims of discriminatory
seniority systems by expanding the statute of limitations period. It provides that
the statute of limitations period commences when (1) the seniority system is
adopted; (2) when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system; or (3)
when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or
a provision of the system. 51
E. Expert Fees: West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey
The CRA also undid the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of attor-
neys fees in West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey.54 In that case, the
Supreme Court held that fees for services rendered by experts in civil rights
litigation may not be shifted to the losing party as part of reasonable attorneys'
fees." In dissent, Justice Marshall said that at issue was more than how much
plaintiff's attorneys should get; at issue was the full and vigorous commitment
that the promises of our country will be available to all regardless of sex or
race.16 In the CRA, Congress adopted Justice Marshall's position. Section 113
47. Id. at 258. In hearings on the need to enact the CRA, Judith Lichtman, President of the
Women's Legal Defense Fund, said that Price Waterhouse sent a "message that a little overt sexism
or racism is okay, as long as it was not the only basis for the employer's action." H.R. REP. No.
40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1991), reprinted in, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585.
48. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991). Damages are limited to remedying
employment practices directly linked to discrimination; thus, where the employer shows that it would
have taken the same action regardless of the motivating factor, the plaintiff will not be reinstated,
hired, promoted, or awarded back-pay. Id.
49. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
50. Id. at 903.
51. Id. at 902.
52. Id. at 911.
53. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79 (1991).
54. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
55. Id. at 1148.
56. Id. at 1149 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Hidle v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., 681
F. Supp. 752, 758-59 (M.D. Ala. 1988)).
19931
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of the 1991 Act provides that expert fees may be included as part of attorneys'
fees under section 1988 and Title VII. 57
F. Extraterritorial Reach: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
The CRA also overruled EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co58 by providing
for extraterritorial application of Title VII to United States employers who employ
U.S. citizens abroad. In that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored the EEOC's
stated intention that Title VII apply to discrimination against American citizens
outside the United States because that position was not expressly reflected until
twenty-four years after Title VII was passedi 9 Section 109 of the CRA renders
the Arabian American Oil Co. decision meaningless by restoring broader protec-
tions to American citizens working for American employers wherever located. 60
G. Consent Decrees: Martin v. Wilks
Prior to Martin v. Wilks,61 most federal appellate courts precluded all
challenges to Title VII consent decrees once courts had entered them. 62 These
courts stressed that the effectiveness of decrees to settle claims early in the
litigation process would be eliminated if the decrees were subject to repeated
challenges. Additionally, these courts emphasized the importance of decrees in
providing relief to victims of systematic employment discrimination. In Wilks,
the Supreme Court ended the restrictive rule followed by most federal courts and
opened the floodgates to perpetual challenge by allowing nonlitigants unlimited
challenges to decrees no matter how long after the decree they filed their
objections. 63
The Wilks rule removed all incentives for employers to enter consent decrees
since every time the employer hired or promoted an individual under the decree,
the employer might be subject to suit.6 Through section 108, Congress struck a
balance between the overly restrictive rule preventing consent decree challenges
prior to Wilks and the overly broad rule enunciated in Wilks itself.6 It precludes
those who had actual notice of the decree and its potential effects and had the
opportunity to object to the decree from challenging it later. Section 108 also
bars challenges to a consent decree when the court determines that the interests
of the challenger were adequately represented by another person or where the
court determines that reasonable efforts to notify interested parties of the decree
were made.
57. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991).
58. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
59. Id. at 1235-36.
60. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077-78 (1991).
61. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
62. Id. at 762 n.3 (citing cases). The Court admitted that a "great majority of the Federal
Courts of Appeals" barred persons who were aware that a lawsuit might affect their interests but
failed to intervene in a timely fashion to challenge the decree from filing a separate lawsuit challenging
the decree. Id. at 762. See also H.R. REP. No. 40, 2d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 49 (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 587 (citing federal cases precluding all challenges to Title VII consent
decrees).
63. 490 U.S. at 769.
64. See also Robert Pear, 1989 Ruling Spurs New Tack in Civil Rights Suits, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
15, 1990, at Al (decision prompts reverse discrimination suits by whites).
65. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (1991).
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II. THE DEBATE OVER RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Although Congress sought to reverse restrictive Supreme Court decisions
through passage of the 1991 Act, many courts are still relying on those now
obsolete decisions when presented with cases that were pending when the 1991
Act was signed into law or even to cases filed after November 21, 1991 where
the discriminatory conduct occurred prior to the passage of the 1991 Act.6 The
debate over retroactivity centers on three sources of authority: the 1991 Act itself,
its legislative history, and Supreme Court precedent on statutory construction.
None of these sources gives a clear answer to the retroactivity questions con-
fronting courts today. The 1991 Act does not state whether it applies retroac-
tively. 67 The legislative history reveals that Congress failed to agree on whether
the 1991 Act applied prospectively only or retroactively. 68 Further, Supreme Court
precedent on statutory construction is conflicting. 69 Thus, the lack of consensus
among federal courts over whether the 1991 Act applies retroactively stems from
the ambiguous sources of authority upon which courts must rely to decide the
issue.
A. The 1991 Act
The bitter bipartisan debate over whether the 1991 Act applied retroactively
to cases arising or pending before President Bush signed the CRA into effect on
November 21, 1991, is reflected in the ambiguity now embodied in the 1991 Act
itself. Several sections of the 1991 Act specifically address the issue of retroac-
tivity.70 To those familiar with the quagmire of statutory interpretation, it should
come as no surprise that these sections conflict. Section 102(d)(1)(A) suggests the
1991 Act applies prospectively; it defines a complaining party as a "person
seeking to bring an action . . . or a person who may bring an action." ' 71
Section 402(b), on the other hand, suggests the 1991 Act applies retroactively.
It exempts the parties in Wards Cove from the CRA. 72 Many proponents of
66. See supra notes 21 to 24.
67. See infra Part II-A.
68. See infra Part II-B.
69. See infra Part II-C.
70. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(d)(l)(A), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991); Pub. L. No. § 402(b),
105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991); see Thamer E. Temple III, Retroactivity of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
in Title VII Cases, 1992 LAB. L.J. 299. Temple suggests other sections of the Act implicate its
application, including the following: § 116, § 109(c), and § 110. Temple, supra, at 300. These sections
specify instances where the Act applies prospectively, implying the rest of the Act applies retroactively.
71. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(d)(l)(A), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991). Similarly, § 104, 105 Stat.
at 1074, defines a complaining party as a "person who may bring an action or proceeding under
this title." Id.
72. Section 402(b), 105 Stat. at 1099 provides that "nothing in this Act shall apply to any
disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial
decision was rendered after October 30, 1983." Id. Congress designed the provision to apply only to
the parties in the Wards Cove case. Senator Simon explained, "[section 402(b)] was intended to craft
a special rule of law protecting the defendant in [Wards Cove] from the application of the parts of
the bill overruling WARD COVE [sic] decision. These amendments express a clear purpose to deny
retroactive application in the circumstances set forth." 137 CONG. REc. H9530 (daily ed. Oct. 29,
1991).
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retroactivity argue that since Congress explicitly legislated against applying the
CRA retroactively to cover the parties in the Wards Cove case, the rest of the
1991 Act must apply retrospectively by necessary implication." Opponents argue
that section 402(b) would be meaningless and redundant if the rest of the 1991
Act did not apply retroactively.74 In fact, Senator Murkowski, who drafted the
section, believed the amendment was necessary to prevent the general rule of
retroactive application. 71 Similarly, section 109(c) provides: "The amendments
made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before
the date of the enactment of this Act." 76
Nothing in the 1991 Act helps reconcile sections implying that the 1991 Act
applied retroactively with sections implying that the 1991 Act applied prospec-
tively. No provision of the 1991 Act provides a clear statement of congressional
intent. Even section 402(a), which provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically
provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon
enactment," is equivocal. 77 It leaves unresolved the question of whether the 1991
Act applies to pending cases or discriminatory conduct occurring before the 1991
Act became law.
B. Legislative History
Members of Congress debated fiercely over whether the 1991 Act should
apply retroactively. Generally, Democrats favored retroactive application, while
Republicans and President Bush favored prospective application only. 78 When the
issue of retroactivity was debated, the controversy centered on the reversal of
the restrictive Supreme Court decisions. 79 As a result, Congress originally passed
a version of the CRA which provided that provisions reversing unfavorable
Supreme Court decisions would relate back to the date the unfavorable Supreme
Court decisions were handed down. 80 Some courts have characterized this original
provision as a super-retroactivity provision since it would have reopened cases in
which judgment had been entered prior to passage of the CRA. am President Bush
73. See infra Part I-B and note 146.
74. Id.
75. 137 CoNG. Rsc. S15,953 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991). However, Senator Murkowski also stated
his amendment should not be taken to influence whether the Act applied to pending cases or past
conduct. Id.; see also 137 CONG. REc. S15,963 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (Sen. Kennedy believed
inclusion of § 402(b), originally known as the Murkowski amendment, made it more likely courts
would apply CRA to pending cases). But see 137 CONG. REc. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen.
Danforth stating: "[Section 402(b)] is intended only to provide additional assurance that the provisions
of the bill will not be applied to certain cases that fit the provisions of that subsection.").
76. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1078 (1991).
77. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 402(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991); see, e.g., Davila v. New York
Hosp., No. 91-C5992, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1993) (section 402(a) is
suspectable to multiple interpretations); Beasley v. Spiegel, No. 92-C4008, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17934, at *8 (N.D. I11. Nov. 24, 1992) (section 402(a) ambiguous).
78. See supra note 25.
79. Id.
80. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (1990). The House version of the 1991 Bill, H.R. 1,
also tied retroactivity provisions to dates of the Supreme Court decisions that were overruled. H.R.
1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1991).
81. See, e.g., Gersen v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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vetoed the proposed Act8 2 and the Senate fell one vote short of overriding it. 3
Proposals for prospective-only application of the Act also failed to muster enough
support to become part of the 1991 Act. 4
Most congressional debate focused on whether cases that had already been
adjudicated could be reopened under the new Act. 5 Opponents argued that
retroactive application would violate the principle of res judicata that the same
issue should not be relitigated.16 They also argued that providing for retroactive
application would allow cases decided under the reversed Supreme Court decisions
to be retried.87 Such a result, opponents argued, would not only be an onerous,
if not impossible, burden on the courts, but would also jeopardize the integrity
of the judiciary and undermine respect for the law.88
Although opponents of retroactive application argued that it threatened
judicial integrity, proponents doubted the Supreme Court had any integrity left
to protect in the area of civil rights. Proponents believed that the Supreme Court
had already abdicated its role in enforcing the civil rights statutes, had drastically
cut back on the effectiveness of civil rights protections, and had left victims of
unlawful discrimination without compensation.89 Proponents stressed that they
were not seeking to implement new legislation, but only to restore the original
meaning to the civil rights statutes. They asserted that applying the CRA retro-
actively - at least in cases where the 1991 Act restores rights sacrificed by
restrictive Supreme Court decisions - is fair because the 1991 Act merely returns
the law to its position at the time the discriminatory conduct occurredP °
82. S. Doc. No. 101-35, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990). President Bush explained the veto, in
part, as follows: "The Bill also contains a number of provisions that will create unnecessary and
inappropriate incentives for litigation. These include unfair retroactivity rules .... " Id.
83. 136 CONG. REC. S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (recording vote of 66 to 34); Neil A.
Lewis, President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives by 1 Vote, N.Y. TIMas, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al.
84. Section 14 of President Bush's proposed Civil Right's Act provided: "This Act and the
amendments made by this Act shall not apply to any claim arising before the effective date of this
Act." H.R. 1375, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Congress also granted Senator Warner its consent
to present an amendment providing for prospective application, 137 CONG. REc. S15,390 (daily ed.
Oct. 29, 1991), but Senator Warner declined introducing the amendment, 137 CONG. Rac. S15,457
(daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
85. See supra note 27.
86. H.R. REp. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 157 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 685-86 (expressing views of Reps. Goodling, Coleman, Gunderson, Fawell, Ballenger, Molinari,
Barrett, and Boehner).
87. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 75 (1991), reprinted in, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694, 761 (provisions of bill reversing Supreme Court decisions will apply to proceedings pending or
begun after date of Supreme Court's decisions) (expressing views of Reps. Hyde, Coble, McColum,
Moorhead, Sensenbrenner, Jr., Gekas, Slaughter, Smith, and Ramstad).
88. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694, 762 (expressing views of L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts).
89. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. S9348 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) Sen. Simon said:
[Iln this entire area of civil rights for individuals, the American public has looked to
the courts for leadership. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1954 and succeeding years led
and Congress has come along. We passed the Civil Rights Act in the early sixties. But
fundamentally it has been the courts that have provided the basic protection for our
people. And now we have a very different situation where it is clear the courts are not
going to provide that basic protection. It is going to have to be the Congress that
provides that basic protection.
Id.
90. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991). Rep. Edwards explained:
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In the end, Congress stalemated over the issue of retroactivity, leaving the
1991 Act without a clear rule, but still riddled with innuendos and implications. 9'
For many members of Congress, the CRA's ambiguity became a kind of mirror,
reflecting whatever scope of applicability its viewer projected upon it. Even in
its final form, senators and representatives offered conflicting views over when
the CRA applied. 92 Some members of Congress agreed at least that the final
compromise version of the 1991 Act left the issue to the courts to decide. 93 For
example, Senator Kennedy, one of the leading proponents for retroactive appli-
cation, conceded: "It will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which
the bill will apply to cases and claims that are pending on the date of enactment." 94
As should be expected, Congress members' views on how the courts should rule
on the issue contrasted sharply. Senator Kennedy predicted that federal courts
would apply the CRA retroactively as they had applied the Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act of 1988, 91 under the rule that when new laws restore prior laws, the
new laws apply retrospectively." Senator Kennedy also claimed that courts would
apply the 1991 Act retroactively under the presumption in favor of retroactivity
set forth by the Supreme Court's holding in Bradley v. Richmond School Board.97
Senator Danforth; on the other hand, claimed that courts would apply the 1991
Act prospectively under the presumption in favor of prospective rulemaking set
forth by the Supreme Court's contrary holding in Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital."
C. Supreme Court Precedent
Senator Kennedy's and Senator Danforth's conflicting views over whether
the Bradley presumption in favor of retroactivity or the Bowen presumption
The application of this bill to pending cases is eminently fair. Much of the conduct of
employers and other respondents at issue in pending cases was committed before the
Supreme Court radically altered the legal landscape, at a time when the defendants were
on notice that the law applied to their conduct and they could be held accountable for
their misdeeds. Our restoration of the law to these pending cases will often mean that
the parties will be governed by the law they all understood to exist at the time the
actions in question were taken. To fail to apply the law retroactively in these situations
would give the respondents an undeserved windfall from the intervening Supreme Court
errors.
Id.
91. See supra discussion in Part II-A.
92. See 137 CONG. REc. 9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (Rep. Edwards arguing the 1991 Act
applied retroactively); 137 CONG. Ran. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth arguing the
1991 Act applied prospectively).
93. E.g., 137 CONG. REc. S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Kennedy); 137 CoNo. Rac.
S15,472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (interpretive memorandum submitted by Sen. Danforth); 137
CONG. REc. S15,472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (interpretive memorandum submitted by Sen. Dole).
94. 137 CONG. REc. S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
95. Pub. L. No. 100-259 § 2, 102 Stat. 28, 28 (1988).
96. 137 CONG. REC. S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Kennedy, citing courts applying
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988 retroactively including, Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical
Center, 695 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 869 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1989); Ayers v. Allain,
893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990); Bonner v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 714 F. Supp. 420 (D. Ariz.
1989)); see also Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
Pending Cases, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 2035, 2044-46 (1992) (arguing that federal appellate courts retroactive
application of Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 to pending cases supports same treatment of
Civil Rights Act of 1991); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic
Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 786 n.36 (1936) (rule against retroactive application
does not apply to curative laws which validate prior acts which would otherwise be void).
97. 137 CONG. Rac. S15,485 (Sen. Kennedy, quoting Bradley, 416 U.S. 696 (1974)).
98. 137 CONG. REc. S15,472-78 (Sen. Danforth, quoting, Bowen, 488 U.S. 204 (1988)).
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against it controlled the application of the 1991 Act predicted the courts' current
confusion. The Bradley and Bowen decisions cannot be harmonized. Their
turbulent relationship continues to wreak havoc on federal courts wrestling with
the retroactivity issue. Federal courts' reliance on the two conflicting and irrec-
oncilable Supreme Court decisions largely explains the diverging decisions on the
issue. In Bradley, Justice Blackmun held that courts should favor retroactive
application of federal statutes "unless doing so would result in manifest injustice
or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.''9 Twenty-
four years later, however, in Bowen, Justice Kennedy said in dictum that
"[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law" and stressed that "congressional
enactments . .. will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their
language requires this result."' 1 Oddly, Bowen makes no reference to Bradley.
Six years later, in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,10' the Court
recognized the tension between Bradley and Bowen, but did not settle the issue
in Bonjorno because clear evidence of congressional intent existed in that case. 10 2
1. Bradley v. Richmond School Board
In Bradley, the issue before the Court was whether plaintiffs could be
properly awarded attorneys' fees under section 718 of Title VII,103 although that
statute was not enacted until the suit was already pending.104 Plaintiffs asked the
court for attorneys' fees for services rendered in desegregation litigation occurring
from March 1970 to January 1971, even though the Education Amendments
providing for reasonable attorneys' fees in school desegregation cases did not go
into effect until 1972.105 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that a
court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision unless doing
so would result in "manifest injustice" or statutory direction or legislative history
to the contrary exists.1 6 Justice Blackmun made it clear that the Court was
stating a general rule favoring retroactive application and that its decision did
not depend on legislative intent. He stated, "we must reject the contention that
a change in law is only given effect in a pending case where that is the clear and
stated intention of the legislature.' 107
More importantly, the Court detailed the origin and justification for the
rule. 08 Justice Blackmun analyzed Chief Justice Marshall's ruling in the early
case of United States v. Schooner Peggy.1° 9 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall
held that on appeal, courts must adhere to the law in effect at the time, even if
99. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
100. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208.
101. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
102. Id. at 838.
103. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 718, 86 Stat. 235, 369 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988)).
104. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 698-99.
105. Id. at 710.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 715.
108. Id. at 711-21.
109. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). The court of appeals had held that a French vessel seized on
the high seas was properly condemned, and, thus, forfeitable to the United States. While the case
was pending, the United States entered a treaty with France in which all property captured but not
"definitely condemned" be returned to France. Id. at 104-07.
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the law changed from the rule governing in the judgment below." 0 Although
Marshall cautioned against infringing on individual rights through retroactive
application, he recommended that in cases of great national concern, the law in
effect at the time of the appeal should control:
It is the general rule that the province of the appellate court is only to enquire
whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subsequent to
the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes
and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its
obligation denied .... It is true that in mere private cases between individuals,
a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a
retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns
. . . the court must decide according to existing laws .... "I
It is hard to imagine a concern more national in its scope than the promise that
the rights guaranteed in our Constitution will be protected equally among all
Americans. Civil rights legislation falls directly within the sphere of national
issues which Chief Justice Marshall said merited retroactive application." 2
After Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Schooner, the question remained,
however, whether courts were required to apply statutes retroactively or whether
that was merely an option. Justice Blackmun stated that the issue was resolved
in Thorpe v. Housing Authority."3 Thorpe stands for the proposition that,
although an intervening law does not explicitly state that it applies to pending
cases, it must be given recognition and effect unless doing so would cause
"manifest injustice."1" 4
In Bradley, Justice Blackmun set out a three-factor test to determine whether
retroactive application would cause "manifest injustice." The factors are: (1) the
nature and identity of the parties; (2) the nature of their rights; and (3) the
nature of the impact of the change in law upon those rights."' Under the first
factor, Justice Blackmun found that awarding attorneys' fees retroactively would
cause no injustice since the suit was not a "mere private suit between individuals."
110. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711-12 (quoting, Schooner, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 110).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 n.4 (1983) (noting that Congress granted
prevailing civil rights plaintiffs the right to collect attorneys' fees because "the public as a whole has
an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by the [civil rights] statutes . . .over and above
the value of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff"); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390
U.S. 400, 417 (1968)(stating Congress intended civil rights plaintiffs to play role of a "private attorney
general"); S. REP. No. 1101, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1976), reprinted in Civil Rights Attorneys
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS at 200 (1976) (noting Congress' belief that civil rights plaintiffs act as "private
attorneys generals"). But see Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d 1370, 1374 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam) ("given the private nature of parties in most employment discrimination cases,
when viewed one by one, are not 'great national concerns' under Bradley").
113. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969), (cited in Bradley, 416 U.S. at 714 (Blackmun,
J.)). In Thorpe, a tenant who had been evicted for starting a tenant's association brought suit
challenging a violation of her First Amendment rights. While the suit was pending, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development issued new procedural regulations governing eviction proceedings.
The regulations did not state whether they applied retroactively to pending cases, but the Supreme
Court held that they did. Id. at 270-73, 283.
114. Id. at 282 (cited in Bradley, 416 U.S. at 715 (Blackmun, J.)).
115. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717.
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School desegregation was a "great national concern." 1 6 Under the second ele-
ment, the Court found that retroactive application would cause no injustice since
the school board had no matured rights to the taxpayers' funds.11 7 Finally, under
the third element, the Court found that awarding fees did not cause injustice
since it did not alter existing rights. The Court might have awarded attorneys'
fees under the common law anyway." 8
2. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital
The Supreme Court changed course 180 degrees in Bowen, where Justice
Kennedy, writing for a unanimous court, said that courts should not apply
statutes retroactively unless their language requires that result." 9 The issue in
Bowen was whether an administrative rule setting cost-reimbursement guidelines
for recouping federal funds paid to hospitals under the Medicare program could
be applied retroactively. 20 The rule at issue was not a congressional statute but
an administrative regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.' 2' Although the Secretary intended the rule to apply retroactively, the
Supreme Court focused on whether Congress had explicitly delegated retroactive
rulemaking power to the Secretary, and held that it did not.'2 2 Despite the narrow
facts presented in Bowen, Justice Kennedy stated the Court's opposition to
retroactivity broadly. He insisted, "Retroactivity is not favored in the law," and
warned, "Even where some substantial justification for retroactive rulemaking is
presented, courts should be reluctant to find such authority absent an express
statutory grant.' 23
In his concurrence in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,
Justice Scalia alleged that the Thorpe-Bradley line of cases constituted an aber-
ration of the well settled principle affirmed in Bowen that congressional enact-
ments apply prospectively unless their language dictates a contrary result. 24 Justice
Scalia claimed that the Bradley line of cases was wrong, and should be over-
ruled.'25 The rest of the Court, however, has not agreed with Justice Scalia; thus,
Bradley, although seemingly irreconcilable with Bowen, remains good law.' 26
116. Id at 718-19.
117. Id. at 720. Justice Blackmun explained that the second element of the Bradley fairness test
"relates to the nature of the rights affected by the change." Id.
118. Id. at 720-21. Justice Blackmun explained that the third element measures the effect applying
the new act would have on prior rights and expectations of the parties. It requires that applying the
new law would comport with fundamental notions of fairness and due process. Blackmun elaborated,
"The third concern has to do with the nature of the impact of the change in law upon existing
rights, or, to state it another way, stems from the possibility that new and unanticipated obligations
may be imposed upon a party without notice or an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 720.
119. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208.
120. Id. at 204-05.
121. Id. at 206.
122. Id. at 210. The Secretary also argued that retroactive application of a law is proper,. regardless
of congressional intent, when the law cures judicial invalidation of a prior law. The Court never
reached the issue. Id. at 207; see also infra note 96.
123. Id. at 208-09.
124. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 841.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 827 (majority recognized "apparent tension" between Bradley and Bowen but did not
resolve issue) id. at 866 (White, J., dissenting with Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) (arguing that
Bradley "is a rule that we have applied with consistency"); Rogriguez Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (not for court of appeals to decide when Supreme Court decision
constructively overrules another decision).
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In deciding whether the CRA applies retroactively, federal courts have
grappled with the conflict between Bradley and Bowen. Some have tried to
reconcile the two; 2 7 some have preferred one case to the other;," while some
have avoided reliance on the cases altogether. 29 Whatever the approach, one
conclusion is clear: the conflict between the irreconcilable holdings has left federal
courts rudderless, tossed about on a sea of confusion over when the CRA
governs.
III. FEDERAL COURT RULINGS ON THE RETROACTIVITY RIDDLE
A. Overview
To date, seven federal courts of appeals have ruled on the issue of whether
the CRA applies retroactively. 30 These decisions, as well as the voluminous
decisions of the federal district courts, 3' can be grouped into roughly five
categories of legal reasoning. First, a few courts have grounded their rulings on
the facial language of the 1991 Act itself. 3 2 Since the 1991 Act is ambiguous, it
is not surprising that courts basing their decisions on the plain language of the
1991 Act itself have split over whether the 1991 Act applies retroactively.13
Second, some courts have reasoned that the legislative history is dispositive of
Congress' intent and have premised their holdings on this basis.3 4 While pur-
porting to rely on the same legislative history, however, courts have disagreed
over whether the 1991 Act applies retroactively.'35 Most courts have agreed, at
least, that congressional intent is unclear and legislative history inconclusive. 3 6
As a result, most courts have followed a third line of analysis, basing their
holdings on the substantive versus procedural rights analysis. 37 These courts hold
127. E.g., Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding Bowen applies to statutes affecting substantive rights while Bradley applies to statutes
affecting procedural rights), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992) .
128. E.g., Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992) (favoring Bowen);
Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. 111. 1991) (favoring Bradley).
129. E.g., Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1551 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding
retroactivity issue under explicit language of 1991 Act).
130. See supra note 17.
131. See supra notes 15-16.
132. E.g., Davis, 976 F.2d at 1551.
133. Compare Hobbs v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, 793 F. Supp. 660, 662 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (plain
language of § 402 dictates against retroactivity) with Stender v. Lucky Stores Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (§§ 402(b) and 109(c) imply Congress intended rest of Act to apply retroactively).
134. E.g., Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).
135. E.g., Fray, 960 F.2d at 1377 (legislative history mandates Act apply prospectively); Stender,
780 F. Supp. at 1302 (legislative history mandates Act apply retroactively).
136. E.g. Libisch v. Black & Decker Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Md. 1992) (legislative history
ambiguous); James v. American Int'l Recovery, 799 F. Supp. 1156 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (legislative history
hopelessly ambiguous); Coulter v. Newmont Gold Co., 799 F. Supp. 1071 (D. Nev. 1992) (legislative
history inconclusive); Robinson v. Davis Mem. Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325, 328 (D.D.C.
1992) ("[N]early every court that has ruled on the issue agrees that the legislative history is not
'clearly' in favor of either prospective or retroactive application."); Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp.
83 (D.D.C. 1991) (legislative history ambiguous).
137. To date, four circuits have premised their holdings on the substantive/procedural rights
analysis. Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), petition for cert.
filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1992) (No. 92-980); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d
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that the Bowen presumption against retroactivity applies to all laws affecting
substantive rights whereas the Bradley presumption in favor of retroactivity applies
to all laws affecting procedural or remedial rights. 3 ' Both cases now before the
Supreme Court, Landgraf v. USI Film Products'39 and Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 40 were decided under the substantive/procedural rights analysis.
Although this analysis is more intellectually sound than solely relying on the
ambiguous 1991 Act or contradictory legislative history, it has proven no more
useful. Even under the substantive/procedural rights analysis, courts have offered
diverging views.' 4' Faced with the exact same provisions of the Act, courts have
classified amendments oppositely; some label the provisions procedural, while
other courts label the same provisions substantive.' 42 The substantive/procedural
rights analysis has turned out to be unworkable since courts cannot agree what
makes a right substantive.
Perhaps growing frustrated with the kaleidoscope of interpretations flowing
from the substantive/procedural rights analysis, recently two federal appellate
courts have adopted novel approaches to the problem. Although the Seventh
Circuit had already ruled against retroactivity under the substantive/procedural
analysis, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered the issue in Luddington v. Indiana Bell
Telephone. 43 In that case, discussed as the fourth approach, the Seventh Circuit
ruled on policy grounds that although it is proper for judicial decisions to apply
retroactively, it is inappropriate for the legislature to rule retroactively.'" The
Eleventh Circuit is the most recent circuit to decide the issue.' 45 Its analysis is
discussed below as the fifth approach to the problem. Rather than trying to
reconcile the Bowen/Bradley conflict under the substantive/procedural rights
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the issue under both Bradley and Bowen
precedent without distinguishing the cases.
B. Plain Language of the Act: Davis v. City & County of San Francisco
Some courts have held that sections 402(b) and 109(c), which provide for
prospective application, imply that Congress intended the 1991 Act to apply
retroactively to all other provisions, otherwise the language would be redundant.'4
1363 (5th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3424 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-737);
Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 207 (1992); Vogel v. Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86
(1992).
138. Id.
139. 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No.
92-757).
140. Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub nom.
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-938).
141. See discussion infra in Part III-D.
142. Id.
143. 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992).
144. Id. at 228.
145. Baynes v. AT & T Technologies, 976 F.2d 1370 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
146. See, e.g., Davis, 976 F.2d at 1551 (prospective only sections reveal Congress' intent to apply
Act retroactively); Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1304 (prospective only sections imply Act applies
retroactively). But see Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("one
might view these two subsections not as redundancies, but rather as insurance policies.").
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These courts have relied on Supreme Court rulings that it is "an elementary
canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render
one part inoperative' '1 47 and that it is a "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant."'' 4
Under this analysis, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit to hold in
favor of retroactivity in Davis v. City & County of San Francisco,49 despite four
previous appellate court decisions to the contrary. 50 The issue presented was
whether expert fees could be awarded as part of attorneys' fees under the CRA
or whether the Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia Hospital, Inc. v.
Casey, 5' which the CRA overruled, applied. The court concluded that "the
language of the Act reveals Congress' clear intention that the majority of the
Act's provisions be applied to cases pending at the time of its passage."' 5 2 Since
section 402(b) and section 109(c) called for prospective-only application, the court
inferred that Congress intended the rest of the 1991 Act to apply to cases pending
at the time of enactment or to prior conduct not barred by the statute of
limitations.'5 3 The court relied on Supreme Court precedent ruling that in statutory
construction, no sections should be construed to be inoperative or redundant. 54
The court also supported its holding by citing to the Act's findings and purposes
sections which outline Congress' intent to overrule recent decisions by the Supreme
Court. 55 The problem with the Ninth Circuit's analysis is that it does not rebut
arguments that other provisions of the 1991 Act imply that the 1991 Act applies
prospectively only. Since many members of Congress agreed that the 1991 Act
left the retroactivity issue unresolved and punted to the courts, it makes little
sense to consider the Act's cloudy language on the subject conclusive. 56
C. Legislative History: Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co.
1. The Majority Opinion
Few courts have rooted their holdings in legislative history since congressional
intent on the retroactivity issue is anything but clear. 57 The Eighth Circuit,
147. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 510 n. 22 (1986) (citing Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)).
148. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (citing,
Colautti, 439 U.S. at 392; Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961); United States
v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
149. 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).
150. Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61
U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1992) (No. 92-980); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th
Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3424 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-737); Mozee v.
American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207
(1992); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati,
959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
151. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
152. Davis, 976 F.2d at 1550.
153. Id. at 1551.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1552.
156. See Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 90-3559, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2009, at
*12 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 1993) ("The negative inference (that Congress intended general retroactivity)
that the Davis court drew from sections 109(c) and 402(b) is an unhelpful legal fiction given the
reality of a sharp conflict between legislators on the retroactivity of the Act generally.").
157. See supra note 136.
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however, became the only circuit to pin its analysis on congressional intent in
Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co.5 8 In Fray, the Eighth Circuit considered
whether section 101(2)(b) of the CRA, which overruled Patterson, applied ret-
roactively to a suit pending on the date of enactment.5 9 In Fray, the plaintiff
filed her action alleging race, sex, and retaliation discrimination under section
1981, Title VII, and state law.l 60 At the time Fray commenced her action, courts
had consistently interpreted section 1981 to apply to discrimination at all stages
of the contractual relationship, including discrimination in hiring, promotions,
and termination.' 6' Shortly before the case went to trial, however, the Supreme
Court decided Patterson and drastically limited the scope of section 1981.162 Based
on the Patterson decision, the employer moved for partial summary judgment,
arguing that Patterson foreclosed the claim. 63 The district court denied the
motion as untimely, and, at the end of the trial, the jury found that Fray's
employer had violated section 198 1.'6 Before Fray's case was heard on appeal,
the law governing the scope of section 1981 claims changed again. 65 Congress
restored the pre-Patterson interpretation of the scope of section 1981 claims
through the CRA.'66 On appeal, the employer argued that a section 1981 judgment
must be reversed under Patterson, while Fray argued it should be upheld under
the CRA.167
The Eighth Circuit held that the CRA did not apply retroactively, reversing
the lower court's holding for the plaintiff. 68 Unable to reconcile the Bowen and
Bradley rules for statutory construction, the court grabbed hold of the baseline
rule set forth in both opinions that "the courts must give effect to a clear
congressional directive as to a statute's retroactivity."'169 The court then glossed
over the ambiguities of the Act's muddled legislative history and argued that
Congress' intent to apply the bill prospectively only could be gleaned from one
simple fact: President Bush had vetoed a bill providing for retroactive application
and a compromise bill omitting these provisions had been enacted.1 70 The Eighth
Circuit claimed this alone was dispositive.
2. Judge Heaney's Scathing Dissent
In dissent, Judge Heaney attacked the majority for reducing the complex
legislative history to the simple fact that retroactivity provisions were omitted. 7'
Judge Heaney reconciled Bowen and Bradley by finding the "common thread"
158. 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).
159. Id. at 1378.
160. Id. at 1372.
161. Id. at 1371-72, 1378; see supra note 39.
162. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1372, 1378.
163. Id. at 1372.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1373-74.
166. Id. at 1373.
167. Id. at 1371.
168. Id. at 1378.
169. Id. at 1375.
170. Id. at 1375-77.
171. Id. at 1379-80 (omission of retroactivity provisions dispositive merely of Congress' intent to
leave retroactivity decision to courts) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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of an "overriding concern for fairness" running through each holding., 72 He
rejected the majority's belief that the Court's statement in Bowen, "'[retroactivity
is not favored in the law,"' stands for a broad general rule. 7 3 Instead, he argued
that Bowen only applied to cases where retroactive application would interfere
with a party's 'justified expectations' or vested rights." 74 Since Fray commenced
her suit before Patterson was decided, Heaney reasoned that defendants had no
expectations that it would apply; thus section 101(2)(b), which restored the pre-
Patterson rule, should govern.' 7
His analysis centered on the three-factor fairness test set out in Bradley.'76
Under the first element, the identities of the parties, Heaney found that the case
was not a mere private case between individuals but a civil rights dispute involving
national concerns of paramount importance. 7 7 Under the second element, the
relevant rights of the parties, Heaney pointed out that Fray had the right to
recover for discrimination at the time of her employment. 78 Finally, and most
importantly, Judge Heaney asserted that applying section 101(2)(b) retroactively
did not impose any new or unexpected burdens on the employer. 179 Fray based
her civil rights suit on discriminatory conduct, all of which occurred before the
Supreme Court decided Patterson. The employer constructively knew that his
conduct might make him liable under section 1981 .1s0 For these reasons, Heaney
dissented from the majority and argued that the 1991 Act should apply retro-
actively.
Judge Heaney's analysis under the Bradley three-factor fairness test better
considers the rights and liabilities of each of the parties and the effects of
retroactive application than the majority's analysis. The majority resolved the
complex issue of retroactivity by isolating a single moment from the Act's lengthy
and turbulent enactment history that was not representative of congressional
intent. As a result of the majority's fanciful interpretation of legislative history,
the court exempted the employer from liability for discriminatory conduct that
was illegal when the employer acted and illegal when the lawsuit was filed.
Though the employer discriminated and the suit was brought before Patterson
was decided, and the CRA restored the pre-Patterson interpretation of section
1981, the majority still decided the case under the intervening Patterson decision.
It avoided judicial responsibility for its unjust decision by pinning the blame on
a fictitious congressional directive. Although many lower federal courts have
reached similar conclusions, few have followed the Fray analysis.
172. Id. at 1381.
173. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)).
174. Id. (citing Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 785, 787 (1936); Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and
Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72
CAL. L. REV. 369, 399 (1984)).
175. Id. at 1381-82.
176. Id. (construing Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 717, 720 (1974)); see supra
note 113.
177. Id. at 1381 (citing Bradley, 416 U.S. at 718-19 (1974); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1381-82.
180. Id.
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D. Substantive/Procedural Rights Analysis
Most courts rely on the substantive versus procedural rights analysis to
resolve the issue. These courts argue that the Bowen presumption of prospective
application applies whenever substantive rights are at issue and the Bradley rule
in favor of retroactive application is limited to statutes affecting procedural or
remedial rights. Interestingly, many courts have found a way to squeeze every
provision of the 1991 Act into the "substantive" rights category - including the
right to a jury trial, thus denying retroactive application under the Bowen
presumption. The Seventh Circuit's cramped interpretation of what constitutes a
"procedural" provision implicating the Bradley presumption in favor of retro-
activity illustrates just how far some courts have gone. In Mozee v. American
Commercial Marine Service Co.,18 the Seventh Circuit asserted that "on appeal,
Bradley, at the most, applies when evaluating damage provisions that do not
affect substantive rights, and arguably applies only to attorney fee provisions., 12
As the Mozee decision illustrates, although the courts are purporting to reconcile
the Bowen and Bradley decisions, they are often pushing the Bradley rule into
oblivion.
The Supreme Court may hinge its determination of the retroactivity issue on
the substantive/procedural rights analysis. However flawed the substantive/pro-
cedural rights analysis, it has allowed courts to reconcile the conflicting Bowen
and Bradley decisions. The Court may prefer to account for the "apparent
tension" ' 3 between the two cases, rather than overruling Bradley. The fact that
the Court granted certiorari to two cases - one involving "procedural" amend-
ments, the other involving "substantive" amendments suggests that the Court
may adopt the substantive/procedural rights analysis.'
1. Substantive/Procedural Rights Analysis Often Abused.
The substantive/procedural rights analysis works to reconcile Bradley With
Bowen when courts treat only those laws altering vested or matured rights as
laws affecting "substantive" rights. A broader definition of "substantive" rights
is unfaithful to Bradley. The Supreme Court stated its holding in favor of
retroactivity broadly in Bradley, drawing on a history of Supreme Court decisions
favoring retroactivity.'85 Courts subscribing to the substantive/procedural rights
181. 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992).
182. Id. at 938.
183. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 827.
184. Landgraf, 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1993) (No. 92-757) (remedial provisions, including right to compensatory and punitive damages and
right to jury trial); Roadway Express, 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3580
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-938) (substantive amendment, § 101(2)(b), overruling Patterson).
185. Id. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 710-11 (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103 (1801)); 416 U.S. at 714 (citing Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)); id.
at 714 n.17 (citing United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) (holding that Civil Rights Act of
1960 passed while case was pending appeal applied); Ziffrin, Inc, v. United States, 318 U.S. 73 (1943)
(holding that amendment to Interstate Commerce Act applied on appeal); Vandenbark v. Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941) (holding that in diversity suit federal appellate court must
apply intervening state supreme court decision decided after lower federal trial court decision);
Carpenter v. Wabash R.R. Co., 309 U.S. 23 (1940) (holding amendment to Bankruptcy Act applied
to pending cases); United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934) (dismissing pending prosecutions
brought pursuant to National Prohibition Act after ratification of Twenty-first Amendment)).
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analysis have often erroneously relied upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Bennett
v. New Jersey'8 6 to grossly expand the meaning of "substantive" rights. In that
case, decided one year before Bowen, the Court was presented with the narrow
issue of whether 1978 amendments to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act applied retroactively to determine whether Title I Funds were
misused during 1970 to 1971.118 In ruling against retroactively applying changes
in the federal grant program, the Court stressed that doing so would deny both
federal auditors and grant recipients fixed, predictable standards for determining
if expenditures were proper. 88 Applying the amendments retroactively would have
upset the parties' reliance on the prior grant schedule. The majority said that
the Bradley presumption in favor of retroactivity did not apply since Bradley
expressly prohibited the presumption where doing so "would infringe upon or
deprive a person of a right that had matured or become unconditional. "189 The
Court explained that the Bradley rule comported with the general rule that
"statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only
prospective effect."'19
Although Bennett merely restated the second and third factors of the Bradley
fairness test, courts have relied on this decision to chart out new, unprecedented
courses. Under the current analysis, courts are classifying amendments as "sub-
stantive" without reference to the law's effect on the' parties involved. Courts
are rejecting the Bradley presumption without first considering the three elements
of the Bradley fairness test.
The current substantive/procedural rights analysis is untrue to the evolution
of the general rule against retroactivity.'19 As American jurisprudence developed
186. 470 U.S. 632 (1985); see, e.g., Hicks v. Brown Group Inc., No. 88-2769, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33730, at *8 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1992) (Bennett limited Bradley presumption in favor of
retroactive application to statutes affecting procedural or remedial rights); Banas v. American Airlines,
969 F.2d 477, 483 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Lockley v. Chao, No. 91-1345, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1315, at *20-21 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1993) (same); Bryant v. Northeast Ill. Reg. Comm. R.R. Corp.,
No. 91-C8364, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18095, at *8 (N.D. 11. Nov. 30, 1992) (arguing that through
Bennett, "[The] Supreme Court reverted back to its traditional stance which promotes prospective
application of new laws.").
187. Bennett, 470 U.S. at 633-34.
188. Id. at 640.
189. Id. at 639 (quoting, Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720 (citing Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149,
160 (1964); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 141, 164 (1944); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)); see Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n Inc., 975
F.2d 886, 904 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that Bennett merely restated the Bradley presumption
that a court should not apply an intervening change to a pending action where it would deprive
persons of matured or unconditional rights; arguing that courts should not rely on the Bennett rule
unless the statute being interpreted alters rights upon which the parties actually relied) (Wald, J.
dissenting); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Bennett is
in accord with the traditional approach to retroactivity taken by American courts, which historically
applied a presumption of nonretroactivity only to statutes that affected vested rights."); Petitti v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 85-3951, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18112, at *16 (D. Mass. Nov.
16, 1992) (arguing substantive standards of conduct test set out in Bennett matches concerns underlying
second and third prongs of Bradley manifest injustice test).
190. Id. at 639 (citing United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982); Greene v.
United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964)). The Bradley decision advocated a discretionary rule which
analyzed the nature of the rights and parties involved to determine whether retroactive application
would be fair. Where rights had ripened so that the parties expected to benefit from them, the Court
warned that new laws which disturbed those "vested rights" should not apply. In Bennett, the Court
redefined the second and third elements of the Bradley fairness test as the rule that "substantive"
rights do not apply retroactively. Id.
191. In the mid-nineteenth century, Great Britain distinguished between statutes changing standards
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in the early twentieth century, courts limited the rule against retroactive appli-
cation. 92 Courts applied the rule selectively to invalidate retroactive laws which
impaired vested rights. 93 Justice Story, who criticized retroactive laws, defined
them narrowly to mean those laws disturbing vested rights or adding new
unexpected liabilities or duties.'9 Where retroactive laws impaired vested rights,
courts generally reasoned that the laws were contrary to justice and violated the
social compact. 95 On the other hand, where retroactive laws did not impair
matured rights, many courts declared these retroactive laws necessary and desirable
under Story's definition.' 96 Similarly, in the nineteenth century, Chancellor Kent
explained that his objection to applying statutes retroactively "is not understood
to apply to remedial statutes, which may be of a retrospective nature, provided
they do not impair contracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to
confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy . . . adding to
the means of enforcing existing obligations."'' 97 Kent asserted that laws that go
towards enforcing existing laws, remedial laws as he called them, may apply
retrospectively.
The manner in which federal courts have denied plaintiffs the benefit of the
CRA on grounds that the CRA alters "substantive rights" perverts the original
rule that laws infringing on vested or unconditional rights of persons cannot
apply retroactively. The expansion of the rule replaces its original justice and
fairness concerns with a robotic and expedient formula. The current analysis
contrasts sharply with Bennett, where the Court refused to apply the new grant
schedule retroactively to avoid disrupting the expectations of the parties involved.
Under the expanded rule, courts are no longer considering whether parties involved
relied on rules which the law altered or cherished rights which the law changed. 9
The formulaic test sacrifices fairness for efficiency.
of conduct or vested rights and statutes affecting procedures and remedies for enforcing existing
laws. In the leading British case, Wright v. Hale, 6 Hurl. & Norm. 226 (Ct. Exchequer 1860), the
court applied a newly enacted statute limiting awards of costs to pending cases. Baron Pollock
explained:
There is a considerable difference between new enactments which affect vested rights
and those which merely affect the procedure in courts of justice, such as those relating
to the service of proceedings, or what evidence must be produced to prove particular
facts.... Rules as to the costs to be awarded in an action are of that description, and
are not matters in which there can be vested rights. When an Act alters the proceedings
which are to prevail in the administration of justice, and there is no provision that it
shall not apply to suits then pending, I think it does apply to such actions.
Id. at 230-31, discussed in Memorandum from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. on Application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act to Pre-Existing Claims 83 (March, 1992) (on file
with NAACP) [hereinafter Memorandum].
192. See Smead, supra note 174, at 776-87.
193. Id. at 784 n.35.
194. Id. at 782 (quoting Justice Story: "Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under existing law, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed
retrospective.").
195. Id. at 789.
196. Id. at 785 (citing, Boston v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102 (1854); Wynee's Lessee v. Wynne, 2
Tenn. (2 Swan) 405 (1852); Fleminton v. Livingston, 6 Wend. 526 (1831); Goshen v. Stonington, 4
Conn. 209 (1822);. Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 566 (1808); Jones v. Jones, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 2
(1804)).
197. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 455-56, quoted in Memorandum, supra note
191, at 78.
198. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 903 ("The majority rule
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2. Substantive Rights: Ignoring Reliance Interests
Many courts have applied the substantive/procedural rights analysis blindly.
Some courts have characterized the CRA amendments as affecting "substantive"
rights without ever considering whether the CRA changed the law that existed
when the parties acted. Once the classification is made, the presumption applies
and fairness considerations are often overlooked. For example, in one of the two
cases now before the Supreme Court on the issue, Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc., the Sixth Circuit labeled section 101(2)(b), which reversed Patterson, as a
provision affecting "substantive" rights, and thus denied plaintiffs access to the
CRA.'9
In Roadway Express, African-American employees sued their employer for
retaliatory discharge under section 1981." The employer fired the plaintiffs in
1986 after they successfully pursued grievances against the employer for subjecting
them to racially discriminatory disciplinary proceedings. 20' In 1987, the employees
filed their complaints alleging violations under section 1981 . 202 Two years later,
shortly before the case was scheduled to go to trial, the Supreme Court decided
Patterson which drastically cut back on the scope of section 1981 .203 The Supreme
Court's cramped interpretation of section 1981 limited the Reconstructionist
Congress' guarantee that newly freed blacks would have the same right to "make
and enforce contracts" as white workers enjoyed. Under the Supreme Court's
novel interpretation of the statute in Patterson, section 1981 only applied to
discrimination in the formation of contracts, not in post-formation contractual
discrimination. Thus, the district court dismissed plaintiff-employees' claims
against the allegedly discriminatory employer on the basis that Patterson barred
the claims.
In doing so, the district court applied Patterson retroactively. The conduct
at issue took place three years prior to the Patterson decision. There is absolutely
no possibility that Patterson guided the employees' or the employer's actions,
yet the Sixth Circuit opined that applying the decision retroactively would not
produce "substantial inequitable results" or "unduly prejudice the plaintiff. ' ' 204
The Sixth Circuit denied retroactive application of section 101(2)(b) which restored
the pre-Patterson law on the basis that amendments affecting "substantive rights
and liabilities" should not be applied retroactively. 20 5 How restoring the law
[under substantive/procedural rights analysis] foists a legal regime on the parties that they could not
have 'known,' much less relied upon, when they acted.") (Wald, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Uncle
Ben's Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1992) ("We recogniie the apparent anomaly that, at the
time of [defendant's] conduct, Patterson had not yet been decided and, under the decisions of many
lower courts, § 1981 applied to racial discrimination in promotions."); Hill v. New York City Bd.
of Educ., No. CV-87-3008, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17330, at *67 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992)
("[DJifferentiating between pre- and post-Patterson conduct would sacrifice the finality and stability
that Supreme Court cases and statutes bring - or should bring - to the law.").
199. 973 F.2d 490, 496-97 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993)
(No. 92-938).
200. Id. at 492.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 493.
205. Id. at 497.
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which existed when the conduct at issue took place affects "substantive" rights
of the parties is entirely unclear. The Sixth Circuit offers no explanation of what
"substantive rights and liabilities" of the specific parties the provision affected;
instead, it merely quotes the Sixth Circuit's equally flawed opinion on the issue
in Vogel v. City of Cincinnati."0 The Sixth Circuit also rooted its opinion in the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Fray, discussed above, though it admitted that the
legislative history is ambiguous. 21
In Vogel v. City of Cincinnati,2° the Sixth Circuit also failed to analyze
how the CRA affected the rights and liabilities of the parties before the court.
Without examining the effect of section 108, the section at issue, on the parties
involved, the court held that section 108 did not apply retroactively to conduct
occurring before its enactment.20 In Vogel, a white male challenged the affir-
mative action policy of the Cincinnati Police pursuant to a consent decree. 210 The
City entered the consent decree to settle an action brought by the Department
of Justice charging it with engaging in hiring and promotion practices which
discriminated against African-Americans and women. 211
The Sixth Circuit based its holding on the Bowen rule against retroactive
application.2 1 2 The court eliminated the conflicting authority of Bradley by
narrowly construing it; the court ruled Bradley should not apply where 'sub-
stantive rights and liabilities,' broadly construed, would be affected. ' 213 Section
108 of the CRA altered Vogel's expectations and rights by barring nonlitigants
from challenging decrees.
The court held that the CRA did not apply to the case, but it denied Vogel
standing to challenge the affirmative action program on other grounds.21 4 The
result in the case is not troubling, but the decision remains seriously flawed. The
court never considered how section 108 altered the parties' rights. It just grounded
its holding under the general rule that where a statute affects substantive rights,
the statute applies prospectively. Judge Ryan concurred in the final judgment,
but dissented from the majority's conclusion that the CRA did not apply
retroactively. He pointed out that "[t]he basis for the court's ruling does not
rest upon any consideration peculiar to Vogel's claim, but rather upon a more
206. Id. at 496 (quoting Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598) ("Bradley should be read narrowly and should
not be applied in contexts where 'substantive rights and liabilities', broadly construed, would be
affected. Clearly, retroactive application of the 1991 Act would affect 'substantive rights and liabilities'
of the parties to this action.").
207. Id. at 496.
208. 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992).
209. Id. at 598.
210. Id. at 596.
211. Id. at 597.
212. Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598 (citing United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir.
1991)). The Court also relied on the EEOC's statement that it would "not seek damages under the[CRA] of 1991 for events occurring before November 21, 1991." Id.. It explained that where
legislative intent is lacking, construction given by the agency should be given "deference" if it appears
"reasonable." Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984)). Without explanation, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the EEOC's policy that the
Act apply prospectively appeared reasonable. Id. (citing EEOC Declares 1991 CRA Does.Not Apply
to Pre-Act Conduct, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), no. 1, at A8 (Jan. 2, 1992)).
213. Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1991)).
214. Id. at 597.
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universally applicable analysis of the statute's retroactivity under general principles
of statutory construction. 21
5
Although the Sixth Circuit failed to analyze whether the CRA affected
Vogel's or the city's reliance on prior laws, its conclusion was not unjust. If the
court had undertaken to determine whether section 108 altered Vogel's vested
rights, it would have found that it did. By contrast, when the Sixth Circuit
applied the Vogel holding in Roadway Express, it denied retroactive application
even where section 101(2)(b) merely restored the parties' rights and liabilities as
they existed when the discrimination occurred and when the complaints were
filed. Similarly, the Fifth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits refused to
apply provisions of the CRA retroactively even where doing so would restore the
parties' rights and liabilities as they existed when the discrimination occurred and
when the complaints were filed. As discussed in detail below, each of these
circuits ignored the parties' reliance on law which the CRA reinstated and applied
Supreme Court precedent which did not even exist at the time the discriminatory
conduct occurred. 216
Under the clear statement rule that "statutes affecting substantive rights 'are
ordinarily addressed to the future and are to be given prospective effect only,'1 2 1 7
the Fifth Circuit held against applying the CRA retroactively in Johnson v. Uncle
Ben's Inc. 21 The Fifth Circuit rejected arguments that the discriminatory conduct
at issue occurred before Patterson had been decided at a time when many federal
courts were applying section 1981 to discrimination in promotions, warning that
if reliance were a factor, litigation would become unwieldy. 21 9 Undoubtedly, the
Fifth Circuit's broad holding against retroactive application, regardless of evidence
showing that the CRA restored rights as they existed at the time the discriminatory
conduct occurred, provides a clear and workable standard. Unfortunately, the
per se rule sacrifices fairness for administrative ease. As the court itself said,
"Any other holding would require unwieldy distinctions between classes of
litigants based on the degree to which they relied on the legal regime antedating
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.1"220 The Fifth Circuit placed judicial efficiency
above individual rights.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit ruled against retroactive application of the
CRA in Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co. 221 under the sub-
stantive/procedural rights analysis. By the time this case reached the Seventh
Circuit on appeal for the second time, the case had already been in litigation for
over fifteen years. 222 The suit involved a class action challenging the defendant's
215. Id. at 601 (Ryan, J. dissenting).
216. Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61
U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1992) (No. 92-980); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th
Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3424 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-737); Mozee v.
American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207
(1992).
217. Uncle Ben's Inc., 965 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Turner v. United States, 410 F.2d 837, 842 (5th
Cir. 1969); citing United States v. Vanella, 619 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1980); quoting Greene v.
United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964)).
218. 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992).
219. Id. at 1374.
220. Id.
221. 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992).
222. Id. at 931.
[Vol. 19:223
1991 Civil Rights Act
employment practices as discriminatory against African-Americans under section
1981 and Title VII.223 The issue presented was whether sections of the CRA
making compensatory damages and jury trials available under Title VII and
restoring the pre-Patterson interpretation of the scope of section 1981 applied
retroactively to cases on appeal and on remand. 224
The Seventh Circuit ruled that it would apply the Bowen rule in favor of
prospective application to all statutes affecting substantive rights, but would only
apply Bradley to cases involving damages provisions not affecting substantive
rights. 25 The court refused to apply section 101(2)(b) which overruled Patterson
retroactively, alleging it affected substantive rights, 2 6 despite the parties' reliance
on pre-Patterson law, which the CRA restored. 227 Although the Seventh Circuit
admitted that allowing for jury trials and compensatory damages did not affect
substantive rights, the court ruled that the Bradley line of cases did not apply
there, either. 228 The court ignored the broad language Justice Blackmun used to
establish the general rule in Bradley and limited the case to its facts. 229 In
vehement dissent, Judge Cudahy attacked the majority opinion, stating, "Through
a mechanical application of principles that are ill-fitting here, the majority has
succeeded in applying rules of law not relied upon at the time of the discriminatory
acts, not recognized when the suit was brought and not in force now. ' 2a0
The District of Columbia Circuit also held against retroactive application of
section 101(2)(b), which overruled Patterson, on the ground that where substantive
rights are at issue, the Bowen rule in favor of prospective application governs. 23'
In Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc. ,232 the court noted that the conduct
involved occurred before the decision in Patterson was handed down, but claimed
that was "of no legal effect. '233 The majority argued that it could not consider
whether the parties relied on pre-Patterson law since there was no way to
determine what parties believed the law to be when they acted.234
3. Substantive Rights: Examining Reliance Interests
Although federal appellate courts have held against retroactive application
under the rule that statutes affecting substantive rights should apply prospectively,
several district courts have reached the opposite conclusion under the same rule.
In Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc. ,235 for example, the court was presented with
the question whether the CRA applied to a suit alleging employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race and sex which was pending at the time the CRA was
enacted. 23 6 The court stressed that, since Congress intended the 1991 Act to
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 936.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 940-41 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 937.
229. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
230. Id. at 941 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 898.
232. 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
233. Id. at 899.
234. Id.
235. 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
236. Id. at 1303.
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correct wrongly decided Supreme Court decisions, the 1991 Act must be applied
retroactively to fulfill Congress' restorative intent.2 7 The court rejected arguments
that the 1991 Act must be applied prospectively since the CRA changed the
substantive law in disparate impact cases. Under the facts of the case, the CRA
merely returned the law to its state at the time plaintiffs filed suit, prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove.238 The court also explained that the
CRA did not affect the substantive rights of the parties, since the discriminatory
conduct at issue was unlawful under Title VII from the start of the liability
period. 239
Similarly, in Mojica v. Gannett Co. ,4 the court retroactively applied sections
of the CRA overruling Patterson and allowing jury trials.24 ' The court reasoned
that applying the CRA retroactively did not infringe on the rights of the parties
since the discriminatory conduct alleged occurred prior to Patterson when rules
governing discriminatory conduct comported with CRA amendments to section
1981.22 The court stressed that the law prior to the CRA was clear and the
defendant's alleged conduct was prohibited.243 Unlike the well reasoned holdings
in Stender and Mojica, none of the federal appellate courts relying on the rule
that statutes affecting substantive rights apply prospectively examined the expec-
tations of the parties involved nor inquired whether the amendments altered
vested or matured rights.
4. Procedural Rights
Federal courts holding both for and against retroactive application of the
1991 Act have generally agreed that statutes affecting procedural or remedial
rights are presumed to apply retroactively. Purporting to follow the same general
rule, however, courts have disagreed over what provisions of the CRA constitute
procedural amendments and which constitute substantive changes in the law.24
Section 102(b), which allows for compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII
cases, has divided courts the most.43
237. Id. at 1306 ("Congress' clear intention was to undo the effects of these cases, which it
believed were wrongly decided, and to restore civil rights law to its previous state. The restorative
intent behind the 1991 Civil Rights Act can only be fully satisfied by applying it to cases which were
pending at the time of its enactment.").
238. Id. at 1308.
239. Id.
240. 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. III. 1991).
241. Id. at 99.
242. Id. at 98.
243. Id.
244. Compare, Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 85-3951, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18112, at *28 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1992) (holding for retroactive application of provisions providing
for compensatory and punitive damages and for jury trials since provisions are procedural); Kent v.
Howard, 801 F. Supp. 329, 336 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (same) with Stout v. IBM, 798 F. Supp. 998
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that amendments to CRA allowing recovery for compensatory damages do
not apply retroactively since new remedies affect substantive rights).
245. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991). Compare, e.g., Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1992) (expanded remedies substantive), cert. granted,
61 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-757); Scherzer v. Midwest Cellular Tel. Co., 797 F.
Supp. 914, 917 (D. Kan. 1992) (same); Lippa v. General Motors Corp., 796 F. Supp. 94, 98 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (same) with Robinson v. Davis Mem. Goodwill Ind., 790 F. Supp. 325, 332 (D.D.C. 1992)
(expanded remedies procedural); Croce v. V.I.P. Real Estate, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (same); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94, 98 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same). One court ruling
that expanded remedies are procedural explained, "The law has never countenanced that an employer
250
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In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, one of the two cases now before the
Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit held that provisions allowing for compensatory
and punitive damages as well as the right to a jury trial did not apply retroac-
tively. 246 In that case, Barbara Landgraf filed her suit in 1989 against her employer
asserting sexual harassment and retaliation claims under Title VII. 247 Landgraf
received a bench trial nine months prior to the enactment of the CRA. 24s The
district court found that Landgraf had been sexually harassed but denied her any
relief under Title VII since the court was not convinced that sexual harassment,
as opposed to personality conflicts, caused Landgraf to resign. 24 9 On appeal,
Landgraf argued that the remedial or procedural provisions of the CRA - including
the right to a jury trial and to compensatory and punitive damages - should
apply retroactively.
20
Despite the Bradley presumption that procedural provisions should apply
retroactively, the Fifth Circuit ruled against retroactivity. The court ruled against
applying plaintiff's right to a jury trial retroactively since the case had already
been tried and retrying the case "would be an injustice and a waste of judicial
resources." ' 251 The court also ruled against allowing the plaintiff to collect
compensatory and punitive damages - arguing that doing so would "result in a
manifest injustice.''252 Although the court recognized that expanded remedies did
"not change the scope of the statute's coverage," the court opined that amended
damages provisions "are a seachange in employer liability for Title VII viola-
tions. ' 25 a The court said that allowing victims of employment discrimination to
recover more fully for their injuries changed the reach of Title VII. 254 It explained,
"There is a practical point at which a dramatic change in the remedial conse-
quences of a rule works change in the normative reach of the rule itself. ' 255 The
may weigh the legal consequences of his discrimination and choose to continue his unlawful conduct.
An employer cannot pay for the right to discriminate because no such right has ever existed."
Robinson, 790 F. Supp. at 332. Compare, Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229 (Posner, J.) (analogizing
retroactively applying amendment allowing for expanded remedies to retroactively applying a change
in the law which makes life imprisonment the punishment for parking violations) with Petitti v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 85-3951, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18112, at *26 n.10 (D. Mass. Nov.
16, 1992) ("Judge Posner also raised the specter of a parking violation becoming retroactively
punishable by life imprisonment. Surely, however, Bradley's manifest injustice escape hatch would
not countenance such horrors.") (citations omitted). Judge Posner exaggerates the impact expanded
remedies will have on employers since § 102(b)(3) sets caps for both compensatory and punitive
damages as follows:
Employers with more than 14 but less than 101 employees: $50,000.
Employers with more than 100 but less than 201 employees: $100,000.
Employers with more than 200 but less than 500 employees: $200,000.
Employers with more than 500 employees: $300,000.
Section 102(b)(3), 105 Stat. at 1073.
246. Landgraf, 968 F.2d at 433, cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3580 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-
757).
247. Id. at 428.
248. Id. at 432.
249. Id. at 430.
250. Id. at 428.
251. Id. at 433.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.; see also Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229 (allowing compensatory and punitive damages
"can have as profound an impact on behavior outside the courtroom as avowedly substantive
changes .... The amount of care that individuals and firms take to avoid subjecting themselves to
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court argued that by strengthening the damage provisions of Title VII, Congress
tipped the scales and increased an employer's incentive to comply with Title VII.
The court said, "It would be an injustice within the meaning of Bradley to
charge individual employers with anticipating this change in damages .... 256
The Fifth Circuit's departure from the presumption that laws affecting
procedural rights should apply retroactively in Landgraf contrasts sharply with
the Fifth Circuit's strict adherence to the presumption that laws affecting sub-
stantive rights should apply prospectively in Uncle Ben's.257 In Landgraf, the
Fifth Circuit worried about subjecting a discriminatory employer to expanded
damages when the employer was found guilty of unlawful intentional discrimi-
nation. Discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex was
illegal prior to the expanded remedies available to victims of discrimination under
the 1991 Act. The CRA did nothing to alter the illegality of discrimination under
Title VII. It merely strenghtened enforcement provisions by increasing available
damages. Yet the Fifth Circuit argued that it would be unfair to subject employers
to costs that they did not anticipate when they intentionally and unlawfully
discriminated. Apparently, the court was concerned that employers be able to
rely on predictable costs when they decide to illegally discriminate. Under the
Fifth Circuit's analysis, the costs of discrimination, like the Medicare reimburse-
ments at issue in Bowen, should be subject to fixed and predictable standards.
By contrast, in Uncle Ben's, the Fifth Circuit, did not consider the injustice
of retroactively applying Patterson to exempt the defendant-employer from lia-
bility under section 1981 for racially discriminatory promotion practices. As
discussed earlier, the case involved discriminatory conduct that was illegal when
it occurred and was illegal under the CRA at the time of the trial and on appeal.
Nevertheless, the court applied the intervening Patterson decision which was
handed down after the alleged discrimination took place and refused to rely on
section 101(2)(b) of the 1991 Act which restored pre-Patterson law. In Uncle
Ben's, the court classified section 101(2)(b) as affecting "substantive" rights and
thus applied the Bowen presumption in favor of prospective-only application.258
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on the Bradley and Bowen presumptions has
been anything but evenhanded. When faced with the issue of whether provisions
of the CRA which reversed Patterson applied retroactively, the Court applied
the Bowen presumption in favor of prospective-only application and refused to
consider whether the amendment altered the rights of the parties involved. When
squarely presented with proof that the provision at issue restored the pre-Patterson
law which existed when the employer discriminated, the court refused to consider
it, alleging that considering reliance interests would lead to unwieldy distinctions.
By contrast, when required to apply the Bradley presumption in favor of
liability whether civil or criminal is a function of the severity of the sanction .... ); Crumley v.
Delaware State College, 797 F. Supp. 341, 352 (D. Del. 1992) ("Because of the potential for lawsuits,
decisions to downsize or to terminate employees often include a calculus of exposure to damages in
civil suits. For this reason it can be persuasively argued that it is unreasonable to expect defendants
to pay damages that were not calculated into their decisions.").
256. Landgraf, 968 F.2d at 433; cf. Lockley v. Chao, No. 91-1345, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1315,
at *29-30 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1993) (allowing compensatory damages and right to jury trial where United
States Peace Corps is defendant since "principles of fairness that require notice and the right to be
heard before subjecting private parties to retroactive liability do not obtain against the government.").
257. See supra note 218.
258. See supra note 220.
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retroactivity, the Fifth Circuit went to great lengths to imagine ways that
retroactive application might interfere with reliance interests. The inconsistent
importance the Fifth Circuit allocated to employer reliance raises questions about
the legitimacy of the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Landgraf. Why the Fifth Circuit
subjected the presumption in favor of retroactivity to microscopic scrutiny but
mechanically applied the presumption in favor of prospective application is
unclear. The court's unequal reliance on the Bradley/Bowen presumptions raises
serious questions about the future of Bradley.
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Landgraf, several district courts
have held that expanded remedies under Title VII do apply retroactively. For
example, in Jaekel v. Equifax Marketing Decision Systems, Inc. ,259 the district
court held that section 102(b), making compensatory damages and jury trials
available in Title VII cases, applies retroactively, at least to cases involving
conduct occurring before the date of enactment but filed after it.260 The court
reconciled Bowen and Bradley, explaining that "statutes affecting substantive
rights and liabilities are presumed to have only prospective effect;" all other
statutes are assumed to apply retroactively under Bradley unless "manifest
injustice" would result. 26' The court held that expanding remedies did not alter
the nature of the discriminatory conduct prohibited, but merely lifted an "artificial
ceiling" and "upped the ante. ' 262 Similarly, since no substantive right to a bench
trial exists, the court reasoned that providing for jury trials would not affect
substantive rights. 26a
Many courts have allowed the right to a jury trial to apply retroactively. 26
These courts point out that the defendant never had a right to a bench trial,
thus the provision does not alter substantive rights. Surprisingly, not all courts
agree. Since jury trials under Title VII may only be requested when asking for
compensatory or punitive damages, many courts that have barred retroactive
application of expanded remedies are also barring retroactive access to jury
trials. 261
5. The Substantive/Procedural Rights Analysis Fails
When the courts cannot even agree that the right to a jury trial is a procedural
right, the substantive/procedural rights analysis breaks down. As courts decide
259. 797 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Va. 1992).
260. Id. at 494.
261. Id. at 492 (quoting Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985)).
262. Id. at 493 ("[D]efendant, if liable for intentional discrimination, is required to bear more
accurately the full cost of the injury inflicted, or in other words, to make plaintiffs more nearly
whole.").
263. Id. at 492-93.
264. Linsalata v. Tri-State Gen. Ins., No. 92-0596, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19665, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 17, 1992) (holding § 102(c)(l) authorizing complaining party to demand jury trial when
seeking compensatory and punitive damages applies retroactively); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
800 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Jaekel v. Equifax Mktg. Decisions Sys. Inc., 797
F. Supp. 486, 494 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same).
265. E.g., Waheed v. H & R Block, No. 91-CV-2428-D, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 670, at*3 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 19, 1993) (since plaintiff not entitled to compensatory and punitive damages retroactively,
plaintiff not entitled to jury trial); Davila v. New York Hosp., No. 91-C5992, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1993) ("[T]he identity of the trier of fact has great effect on many trial
preparation decisions. Full blown civil litigation involving both compensatory and punitive damages
before a jury is far removed from non-jury litigation with conciliation mechanisms and only limited
equitable non-punitive relief.").
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the retroactivity issue on a piecemeal basis, one day ruling on whether amendments
changing the scope of section 1981 apply retroactively, another day deciding
whether the right to a jury trial applies retroactively, a labyrinth of conflicting
decisions are being handed down.
For civil rights plaintiffs, access to provisions of the CRA will not only
depend on what rights are implicated, be they procedural or substantive, but on
what court hears the case. In the Second Circuit, for example, one of several
circuits yet to rule on the retroactivity issue, district judges within the same
circuit, and sometimes within the same district, have taken diverging views.
266
When plaintiffs have no good way of predicting whether the law applies to them
or not, the swift resolution of suits through settlement is impeded and forum
shopping begins.
The substantive/procedural rights analysis fails for two reasons. First, since
the terms "substantive" and "procedural" are amorphous, courts can and have
played fast and loose with the terms. Second, courts relying on the substantive!
procedural rights analysis have ignored parties' reliance interests. Many courts
have automatically applied the restrictive Supreme Court decisions which the
CRA sought to overrule to cases involving conduct which arose before those
cases were even decided. In cases where applying the 1991 Act would merely
reinstate the law which existed when the discrimination occurred, many courts
have resurrected the decisions the CRA overruled and applied them to disputes
pre-dating the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretations of the civil rights
statutes.
Once a court operating under the substantive/procedural rights analysis
classifies a provision as "substantive," the Bowen rule in favor of prospective-
only application kicks in and victims suffering discrimination prior to November
21, 1991 are barred from relying on the "substantive" provision. Instead, courts
apply the restrictive Supreme Court interpretations of civil rights statutes handed
down between 1989 and 1991. That result makes no sense when the Supreme
Court decision applied antedated the discrimination at issue.
One section of the CRA which courts have labeled as "substantive," section
101(2)(b), illustrates the unreasonableness of decisions premised on the substan-
tive/procedural rights analysis. Section 101(2)(b) overturned Patterson and re-
stored the pre-Patterson interpretation of the scope of section 1981.267 In Patterson,
the Supreme Court cut the legs out from under section 1981 by limiting the cause
of action to pre-contractual employment discrimination. In doing so, it barred
claims based on failure to promote or discriminatory dismissals.261 Prior to that
ruling, victims of employment discrimination could recover under section 1981
for post-contractual employment discrimination. 269 Most courts now agree that
section 101(2)(b) constitutes a "substantive" change in the law. 270 Thus, many
courts, including the Fifth Circuit in Landgraf,271 the case now before the Supreme
266. Compare Davila v. New York Hosp., No. 91-C5992, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36 (S.D. N.Y.
Jan. 4, 1993) (provisions allowing for jury trials, compensatory and punitive damages do not apply
retroactively) with Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(provisions allowing for jury trials, compensatory and punitive damages apply retroactively).
267. See supra note 41 to 42 and accompanying text.
268. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
269. See supra note 39.
270. See supra note 22.
271. See supra note 246.
[Vol. 19:223
1991 Civil Rights Act
Court, have mechanically refused to apply section 101(2)(b) to cases pending
when the CRA was enacted. 272 Such a holding is reasonable if Patterson was the
law when the alleged discrimination occurred. But in disputes born before
Patterson was decided, when courts interpreted section 1981 literally, and thus
more broadly, applying the CRA retroactively would merely restore the law to
its prior state. In those instances, the employer would not be prejudiced by
retroactive application since the employer's rights and expectations under section
101(2)(b) of the CRA would be the same as under the law which governed when
the discrimination occurred. Despite the fairness of applying section 101(2)(b)
retroactively where the 1991 Act merely restores prior law, most courts have
refused to do so. Few have hesitated to apply Patterson retroactively, however,
to cases arising before the Supreme Court gutted the scope of section 1981.273
The judiciary's use of the substantive/procedural rights analysis as a clear
statement rule that cannot be bent to evaluate whether the section of the 1991
Act at issue really changes the rights of the parties involved at all, or whether it
returns the law to its prior state, is patently unfair. Judge Heaney of the Eighth
Circuit recently condemned the trend to decide the retroactivity issue under the
Bowen standard in favor of prospective only application whenever "substantive"
rights are involved.2 74 He argued that doing so:
fails to involve courts in any examination of the effects of particular laws and
instead applies a stringent and unyielding test. Statutes differ in purpose and
effect, yet the clear-statement rule treats them all identically. In certain cases,
the Bowen presumption may prevent unjust application of the laws. With some
statutes, however, retroactivity 'can . . . actually serve the cause of legality....
It can serve to heal infringements of the principle that like cases should receive
like treatment' .... When a court applies the clear statement rule to an ambig-
uous statute without justification, it avoids its judicial responsibility to interpret
statutes.25
Unfortunately, few courts have been willing to examine how the CRA will affect
the rights and expectations of the parties involved .276
E. Luddington v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.: Policy Grounds
Although the Seventh Circuit had ruled against retroactive application of the
CRA in Mozee277 under the substantive/procedural rights analysis, the court
272. See supra notes 22 and 198.
273. See supra notes 23-24. One circuit court judge apologized for the inequity, stating, "this
case is one of a vanishing breed to which we must apply the Patterson standards. Unfortunately, the
parties never had the opportunity to develop the record from this perspective." Taylor v. Western
& S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1199 (7th Cir. 1992) (Ripple, J.). See also, Davila v. New York
Hosp., No. 91-5992, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36, at *21 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1993) ("That the
conduct for which Davila seeks to recover occurred prior to the Patterson decision, when many lower
courts had concluded that section 1981 applied to racial discrimination in promotions, terminations,
and other aspects of contractual relations, does not warrant a different result."); Rush v. McDonald's
Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1120 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that "since the conduct complained of by the
plaintiff occurred between 1985 and 1987, it follows that her action under section 1981 is barred by
Patterson" without accounting for fact that conduct preceded Patterson holding by two years).
274. Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., No. 88-2769, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33730 (8th Cir. Dec. 30,
1992).
275. Id. at *17 (quoting Estrin, supra note 96, at 2048-50).
276. See supra note 198.
277. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 931.
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abandoned that line of analysis when it took up the issue again in Luddington
v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. 278 The issue presented in Luddington was whether
section 101(2)(b), overruling Patterson, and section 102(b), allowing victims to
recover compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII cases, applied retroac-
tively to a case where both the discriminatory conduct occurred and the case was
filed before the CRA was enacted.2 79 Unlike other circuit courts ruling on the
issue of retroactivity, the Seventh Circuit did not hinge its decision on the
Supreme Court's holding in Bowen. Instead, Judge Posner, writing for the
majority, grounded the decision on the premise that judicial decisions should
apply retroactively, but legislation should not.2 0
He offered three reasons to justify applying judicial decisions, including
Patterson, retroactively: (1) litigants might lack incentives to seek legal change
through courts if decisions would not apply retroactively; (2) courts might feel
too free to make changes in law if decisions were not applied retroactively,
because costs in the disturbance of expectations would be minimized by prospec-
tive application; and (3) the power of the court to disturb settled expectations is
held in check by a judicial tradition of incremental change. 28 1
Judge Posner also explained why the rule that judicial decisions should apply
retroactively should be reserved for congressional enactments. First, he asserted
that the "legislature has awesome power uncabined by a professional tradition
of modesty" which constrains courts from abusing their ability to make laws
apply retroactively. 28 2 This argument is ironic in the context of the CRA, where
the Supreme Court had widely strayed from its own path of decisions and
Congress erased the Supreme Court's mistakes and led the law back to its prior
path. Second, Posner alleged that Congress did not and could not restore pre-
Patterson interpretations of section 1981. 283 In clear contrast to the explicit
language of the 1991 Act itself, where Congress unequivocally states that its
purpose is "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court, ' 2 4 Judge
Posner asserted that the "new civil rights act reflects contemporary policy and
politics, rather than a dispute between Congress and the Supreme Court over the
mechanics of interpretation.' '281 Judge Posner ignored overwhelming evidence in
both the Act itself and legislative history that Congress drafted the CRA in direct
response to a series of Supreme Court decisions that curtailed civil rights protec-
tions.2 6 In an early version of the Act, Congress explicitly provided rules of
statutory interpretation for courts interpreting the civil rights laws. 2 7 Stronger
278. 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992).
279. Id. at 226.
280. Luddington, 966 F.2d at 228.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 228-29. Posner argued that the pre-Patterson legal regime was merely a set of lower-
court decisions constituting a tentative regime, which Patterson swept away. Id.
284. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
285. Luddington, 966 F.2d. at 228.
286. See supra note 27.
287. See S.2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1107 (1990) quoted in, 136 CONG. REc. H9554 (daily
ed. Oct 12, 1990) (setting out "Rules of Construction for Civil Rights Laws" for judicial interpretation
as follows, "All Federal laws protecting the civil rights of persons shall be broadly construed to
effectuate the purpose of such laws to provide equal opportunity and provide effective remedies.").
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proof that the CRA owed its very existence to the dispute between Congress and
the Supreme Court over statutory interpretation can hardly be fathomed. Posner's
analysis simply replaces reality with his own views on how Congress should
function.
Third, Judge Posner also offered pragmatic reasons against applying the Act
retroactively. 28 He stated that broad retroactive application would defeat em-
ployers' reliance interests and create "massive dislocations" in ongoing litiga-
tion. 29 He also asserted that courts should avoid selective retroactive application
to cases where the employer can show little or no reliance interest on the law
altered by the CRA because such a policy would "create unwieldy distinctions."2"9
Judge Posner's arguments based on administrative convenience and costs are
unpersuasive. In the similar decision handed down by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 291 also holding that section 101(2)(b)
did not apply retroactively, 292 Judge Wald dissented, explaining it would be just
as easy for the court to apply the section retroactively than to follow the majority
rule and rely on the dying Patterson decision. 293 Wald stated:
Administering a rule based on reasonable, objective expectations and determining
whether rights had 'vested' under a particular legal regime are tasks which the
courts deal with every day ... the inquiry would merely require that the court
ascertain the date of the conduct in question, the same determination that the
court would have to make when following the majority's rule. 294
Judge Wald stressed that, even if applying the 1991 Act retroactively required
the judiciary to "undertake an extra burden, costs and administrative difficulties
are not trumps, and, in this case, they seem well worth bearing in the service of
fairness and justice for the parties." 29
Judge Posner left the question open, however, as to whether the 1991 Act
applies to cases filed after the CRA was enacted but involving conduct occurring
before the date of enactment. 296 He stated, "We hold that the new act is applicable
only to conduct engaged in after the effective dates ... in the act, at least if
the suit had been brought before the effective date. ' ' 297 Judge Posner's concerns
with administrative convenience support applying the 1991 Act to all cases filed
after its enactment date. Any other holding would result in two diverging strands
of judicial interpretation - one governed by Supreme Court precedent obliterated
by the Act, the other governed by the CRA itself. Unless the CRA applies to all
complaints dated after November 21, 1991, "massive ongoing litigation" will
continue. If parties must litigate whether the conduct involved occurred prior to
the passage of the CRA, courts will be forced to make the "unwieldy distinctions"
Judge Posner cautioned against. Few courts, however, have distinguished between
288. Id. at 229-30.
289. Id. at 229.
290. Id.
291. Gersman, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
292. Id. at 899.
293. Id. at 914-15.
294. Id. (Wald, J. dissenting) at 914.
295. Id.
296. Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229-30.
297. Id. (emphasis added).
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pending cases and suits filed after the enactment date but involving pre-Act
conduct. Many lower federal courts have relied on Luddington to bar retroactive
application of the CRA to cases filed after the date of enactment but involving
pre-Act discrimination. 298 As litigation continues over the application of the CRA
to pre-Act conduct, regardless of when the complaint was filed, it is becoming
apparent that Luddington did little to shut the floodgates to the onslaught of
litigation surrounding retroactivity.
F. Baynes v. AT&T Technologies
The Eleventh Circuit is the latest federal court of appeals to rule on the
retroactivity issue. Unlike the majority of courts now deciding the issue under
the substantive/procedural rights analysis, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the issue
under both Bowen and Bradley without making any effort to distinguish the two
cases. In Baynes v. AT&T Technologies,299 the Court considered whether section
101(2)(b), which overruled Patterson, and section 102(c), allowing for jury trials,
applied retroactively to a case pending on appeal when the CRA was enacted) °°
Finding the 1991 Act void of a congressional directive over proper application,
the court concluded that the 1991 Act must apply prospectively under the Bowen
rule.30 1 The court lauded the Bowen rule, stressing that the "judicial branch
cannot unilaterally craft into statutes provisions which Congress plainly did not
agree to enact into law. ' 30 2 The court also emphasized that people should be
able to conform their conduct to the law without the threat of retrospective
liability or increased penalties. 30 3
The court went on to analyze the issue under the Bradley three-factor fairness
test. 304 Under the first element, the nature and identities of the parties, the court
distinguished the Bradley school desegregation case from the employment dis-
crimination case before the court. It argued, "Given the private nature of the
parties in most employment discrimination cases, we think these cases, when
viewed one by one, are not 'great national concerns' under Bradley, but rather
are 'private cases between individuals."' 3 0 5 The court's reasoning is satisfactory
only if one does not consider employment discrimination a societal problem.
Under the second element, the nature of the parties' rights, the court
considered whether the provisions of the 1991 Act at issue worked substantive
298. Tomblin v. Chicago State Univ., No. 92-C2937, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 8, 1993) ("[T]his Court has since held (as have most if not all of its colleagues in this
Circuit) that Luddington's analysis applies with equal force to post-1991-Act lawsuits such as this
one, which cover allegedly discriminatory conduct that preceded the effective date of the 1991
statute."); Beasley v. Spiegel, No. 92-C4008, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17934, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
24, 1992) ("[I]t is recommended that the Act not be applied to preact conduct regardless of the filing
date."); Redden v. Wal-Mart Stores, 806 F. Supp. 210, 211 (N.D. Ind. 1992) ("The court agrees
with those district courts within this circuit that have held that Luddington forecloses applicability
of the 1991 Act in cases in which the challenged conduct occurred before November 21, 1991, even
if the complaint was filed after that date.").
299. 976 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1992).
300. Id. at 1372.
301. Id. at 1373.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1374 (quoting Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717).
[Vol. 19:223
1991 Civil Rights Act
changes on prior law. 3°6 The court concluded that section 101(2)(b), which
overruled Patterson, constituted a "substantive" change in law, but concluded
that section 102(c), which allowed jury trials in Title VII cases, constituted a
procedural or remedial change in the law. 307 The court was unwilling, however,
to treat these discrete provisions of the 1991 Act separately. Finding that the
1991 Act affected some substantive rights, the court concluded that the entire
1991 Act must apply prospectively.30
Finally, the court considered the effect of the change in law upon the parties'
rights.3°9 The court determined that although the 1991 Act did not alter the
"basic norm of nondiscrimination . . . imposing potential liability for damages
for post-hiring behavior under section 1981, as opposed to the lesser Title VII
remedies, would significantly and unfairly have an effect on the parties."310 The
court considered what prior law guided the employer and victim throughout the
litigation of the case, but failed to analyze what law existed when the discrimi-
nation occurred."' The court did not address whether the employer discriminated
before Patterson changed the scope of section 1981, or whether the discrimination
occurred after the Patterson decision had been decided. Although the court
purported to consider the Bradley three-factor fairness test, in truth, its analysis
was severely deficient and untrue to the original test. The court trivialized the
importance of employment discrimination cases, failed to treat the party's indi-
vidual rights distinctly, and failed to consider whether the new law changed the
law in effect when the parties acted, as opposed to the law in effect when the
case was litigated.
G. Federal Courts Have Failed to Analyze the Retroactivity Issue Consistently
Federal courts have faltered when faced with the retroactivity issue. None
of the methods federal courts have taken to resolve the dispute works very well.
Federal courts have failed to interpret the murky language of the 1991 Act
consistently, have failed to interpret Congress' intent on the issue consistently,
and have failed to agree on substantive/procedural distinctions. The Seventh
Circuit's oft cited Luddington holding is also disturbing because Judge Posner
misrepresented congressional intent behind the 1991 Act. He focused on admin-
istrative convenience rather than fairness considerations. Although the Luddington
decision only decided against retroactivity for cases pending when the CRA was
enacted, many lower courts are expanding the holding to apply to pre-Act conduct
cases as well, no matter when the complaint was filed. The expansion of
Luddington has led to continued litigation over the retroactivity issue. The
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Baynes is no more helpful in resolving the issue
since the Court abused the three-factor Bradley fairness test to arrive at its
conclusion. The myriad of inconsistent and sometimes even unjust decisions the
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1375.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. The court noted that "this case has been litigated for two and one-half years through a
non-jury trial on the merits, all in reliance on prior law." Id.
19931
Journal of Legislation
federal courts are handing down proves the need for an end to the tangled web
of ambiguity surrounding the retroactivity question.
IV. THE NEED FOR CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION
Congress' failure to enact a provision calling for retroactive application is
now unraveling the purpose of the CRA. Without retroactive application, a gap
in the law is created where some plaintiffs in court today are governed by
yesterday's Supreme Court decisions which the 1991 Act overruled or by weak
Title VII enforcement provisions which the 1991 Act strengthened. The federal
courts have been wrestling with the retroactivity problem for over a year now
and no end to the problem is expected anytime soon. The decisions of the lower
courts are troubling both in their analysis and in their results. In their defense,
federal courts have been handicapped in addressing the problem by the equivocal
language of the 1991 Act, its turbulent legislative history, and conflicting Supreme
Court precedent on statutory construction. The federal courts have not been
resolving the issue very well, and in fact, they are not the branch of government
that should be resolving the problem at all. Congress created the mess; Congress
must fix it.
A. Consequences of the Federal Courts' Failure and Inability to Apply the
1991 Act Retroactively
The Judiciary's failure and inability to apply the 1991 Act retroactively has
many undesirable consequences. In cases where the CRA merely restores the
rights of the parties involved by reversing Supreme Court decisions, the federal
courts' refusal to apply the CRA retroactively is unfair to victims of employment
discrimination and grants employers who did not rely on the decisions an
unjustified windfall. Whenever federal courts continue to rely on the Supreme
Court decisions which the CRA overruled, congressional policy in enacting the
CRA is defeated.
The refusal of a majority of lower federal courts to apply the procedural
amendments to Title VII retroactively raises other problems. The 1991 Act allows
victims of discrimination the right to a jury trial and to compensatory and
punitive damages when they prove that their employer intentionally discriminated
against them. Prior to the expanded remedies, some employers may have been
less vigilant in avoiding discrimination. Although intentional discrimination was
always illegal under Title VII, the expanded remedies may have increased some
employers' incentives to comply with the law. But it did not alter employers'
substantive rights, unless employers had a substantive right to discriminate.
Clearly, under Title VII, they did not. Thus, under the Bradley presumption that
statutes affecting procedural or remedial rights apply retroactively, courts should
uniformly be holding that the expanded remedies and the right to a jury trial
apply retroactively. They have not. As a result, some victims of discrimination
are being less than fully compensated for their injuries.
The confusion over whether the CRA applies retroactively is placing a heavy
burden on federal courts. Without a clear rule, plaintiffs and employers may be
reluctant to settle cases, thus, adding to the federal courts' already heavy dockets.
Even in circuits which have ruled on the issue, litigation continues since each
section of the CRA poses a new angle to the question.3 1 2 In addition, in circuits
312. In the Eighth Circuit, for example, the court of appeals has redecided the issue of retroactivity
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where courts have decided against retroactivity, victims of employment discrim-
ination who cannot sue under the 1991 Act amendments will have less incentive
to seek redress for legitimate grievances. For example, when compensatory and
punitive damages under Title VII are not available, fewer victims may file suit.
If so, discriminatory employers may escape punishment for their illegal conduct.
Courts' inconsistent rulings on the retroactivity issue are piercing holes
through congressional policy and eroding Congress' promise to strengthen pro-
tections available to victims of employment discrimination. Federal courts are
now handing down a dual line of competing decisions - one under the expanded
CRA, the other under the restrictive Supreme Court decisions and weaker Title
VII enforcement provisions which pre-dated the CRA. As those dying cases and
superseded enforcement provisions continue to exert dead hand control, the public
promise of the CRA slips away. One month before President Bush signed the
1991 Act into law, Representative Edwards of California argued that application
of the CRA to pending cases was essential lest the courts speak with two voices
on employment discrimination matters. He cautioned:
Practical concerns as well as those of elementary fairness, have led us to the
conclusion that the application of the bill to pending cases is essential. Litigation
under Title VII and § 1981 can take decades to resolve. To have limited this
legislation to conduct occurring after the date of enactment would have led to
an intolerable result: For the next two decades, the courts will be handing down
two sets of contradictory decisions .... 313
Representative Edwards' worst predictions have now been realized.
The problem with courts' continued application of those restrictive interpre-
tations of the civil rights statutes is that the full restorative intent of the 1991
Act is delayed indefinitely. The dichotomous cases courts are handing down now
are frustrating our country's national policy against employment discrimination
as Congress most recently defined it in the 1991 Act. The federal courts' thinning
of Congress' commitment to eradicating employment discrimination lends cre-
dence to Chief Justice Marshall's recommendation, almost two hundred years
ago, that in cases of great national concern, courts must decide according to
existing laws even if the new laws affect the rights of the individual parties
involved. 31 4
Marshall recognized that societal policy goals sometimes outweigh individual
rights. An example where our country's policy goals have overridden individual's
prior rights is the abolition of slavery. When Congress enacted the Thirteenth
Amendment, it did not limit the force of the amendment to blacks born or
brought to the country after the amendment was ratified. The amendment freed
all slaves, whatever alleged property right prior slave owners may have paid for
at least five times since Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992). In Fray,
the Eighth Circuit held against retroactive application of § 101(2)(b). Id.at 1378. The Eighth Circuit
has reconsidered the issue for other provisions of the 1991 Act, each time ruling against retroactivity.
Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1992) (§ 113); Hughes v.
Matthews, 980 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1992) (§ 102(c)); Huey v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir.
1992) (§ 114); Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 155-56 (8th Cir. 1992) (§ 102); see also
Hicks v. Brown Group Inc., No. 88-2769, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33730 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming
Fray that § 102(2)(b) does not apply retroactively).
313. 137 CONG. REc. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (citations omitted).
314. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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and expected to receive. If the amendment had not applied uniformly, it would
have made a mockery of the nation's new commitment to ending slavery.
Similarly, unless the nation's strengthened commitment to ridding discrimination
in employment is uniformly applied, the nation's policy is severely undermined.
When courts decide employment discrimination cases under the old rules rather
than under Congress' renewed commitment to obliterate employment discrimi-
nation, Congress' goals in enacting the 1991 Act go unrealized.
B. The Issue Should Not Be Left to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to two cases involving the retro-
activity issue which it will hear next fall. a"' Since the legislative history is equivocal
and the language of the Act anything but clear, the Court, like the lower courts,
will be unable to rely on congressional intent and ultimately, will be forced to
turn to case law for guidance. How the Court will reconcile the Bowen/Bradley
conflict remains unclear. In Bonjorno, however, Justice Scalia argued in dicta
that Bradley should be overruled. 1 6 Although there were four dissenters who
disagreed with Justice Scalia in that opinion, two of the dissenters, Justice
Brennan and Justice Marshall, have since retired. Whether Scalia now has enough
support to carry out the reversal of Bradley or whether he still wants to do so
remains unknown.
Congress' differences with the Supreme Court over proper interpretation of
the civil rights statutes prompted the drafting of the CRA in the first place.
Thus, it makes little sense to leave the job of deciding the extent of the CRA's
application to the Supreme Court now. When the Supreme Court decides the
issue, it will most likely rule in a way that causes yet another dispute between
the legislative and judicial branches to erupt.3"'
When the Supreme Court finally decides the issue, it is likely to rule against
retroactively applying all provisions of the Act - both those affecting procedural
and substantive rights. Recently the Court suggested in dicta that Congress'
decision to permit jury trials and allow victims of intentional discrimination to
collect compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII, "signals a marked
change in its conception of the injury redressable by Title VII. ' '3 s The Court
also stated in dicta, "the CRA of 1991, amended Title VII in significant
respects." 31 9 The Court's emphasis that CRA provisions allowing for jury trials
and expanded remedies in Title VII cases caused "marked change" and constituted
"significant" amendments, suggests that when the Court decides the issue, it will
characterize purely remedial changes as substantive amendments. Thus, the Court
315. Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Inc., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnatti, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
316. See supra note 125.
317. The Supreme Court intimated that it would rule against retroactivity under the Bowen rule
in United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 74 n.12 (1992), where the Court stressed that the 1991
Act significantly changed Title VII litigation. Id. See James H. Coil III & Amy Weinstein, Past Sins
or Future Transgressions: The Debate Over Retroactive Application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 18
EMPLOYEE REL. LAB. J. 5, 21 (1992) (predicting that Supreme Court will rule against retroactive
application under Bowen).
318. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 n.12.
319. Id. at 1872 n.8 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 19:223
1993] 1991 Civil Rights Act 263
may rule against retroactivity under the Bowen rule that where "substantive"
rules are at issue, the law must only apply prospectively.
Congress should provide the Supreme Court with a directive that the 1991
Act applies retroactively. Unless Congress supplies the mandate, the Supreme
Court will most likely uphold the Landgraf and Roadway Express decisions which
denied retroactive application of the CRA. If the Supreme Court was going to
rule in favor of retroactivity, one expects that they would not have been content
to leave the issue to the lower courts when the circuits had unanimously held
against retroactivity. The Court denied certiorari on the issue twice before granting
certiorari last February. a20 The Court's delay in addressing the issue predicts the
conclusion the Court will reach. With a new Congress and a new President in
place, Congress should enact corrective legislation that allows for the 1991 Act
to be uniformly applied to all employment discrimination suits presently being
decided in the federal courts. It makes little sense to save a response until after
an unfavorable Supreme Court decision has been handed down.
C. Proposed Statute for Correcting the Retroactivity Problem
I propose the following amendment to resolve the chaotic, inconsistent, and
often unfair treatment that courts have given to the retroactivity issue. The
proposed amendment aims to ensure that courts will apply the CRA to all cases
filed after the CRA was enacted and to all cases that were pending when the
CRA was enacted that have not yet exhausted their appeals. The statute should
read:
This'Act amends the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and all amendments made by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, be they substantive, procedural, remedial, or otherwise,
to apply to all parties who filed their claims on or after November 21, 1991 and
to all cases pending on that date, regardless of when the alleged discriminatory
conduct occurred, to which the statute of limitations period has not yet run nor
final appeal been exhausted at the time of this enactment.
This proposed amendment will not reopen cases that have been finally settled,
but assures that courts will apply the CRA to cases on the docket now.32' This
amendment should correct the divisive dual line of decisions the federal courts
are handing down. It would fulfill Congress' goal to restore civil rights protections
as they existed prior to the Supreme Court's restrictive decisions, without opening
up a Pandora's box by relitigating cases that have been finally decided.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress should act quickly to fulfill the promises of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. With the 103d Congress in place, Congress should do now what it failed
320. See supra note 315.
321. Most arguments posed by members of the 101st Congress against applying the 1991 Act
retroactively no longer relate to the issue facing courts today. That debate largely centered upon a
super-retroactivity provision which required cases decided under Supreme Court decisions which the
1991 Act overruled to be reopened and redecided under the CRA. See supra notes 77-79. This Note
does not advocate that Congress undertake the herculean task of drafting legislation that would
require courts to reach back in time and reopen old cases already finally decided where appeals have
been exhausted. It urges Congress to end the unjust dichotomous decisions that courts are handing
down today.
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to accomplish under the Bush administration: legislate retroactive application of
the CRA. After President Bush vetoed an early version of the Act which
specifically called for retroactive application, the Senate fell short of overriding
the veto by one vote and left the issue to the courts. Faced with the issue, most
courts of appeals have refused to apply the 1991 Act to cases pending when
President Bush signed the 1991 Act into law. Some have also refused to apply
the 1991 Act to cases filed after the CRA was enacted but involving discrimination
which occurred before the CRA became law. For this reason, federal courts are
continuing to apply Supreme Court decisions which Congress sought to overturn
through the CRA.
Many courts are applying those much criticized Supreme Court decisions to
cases that were already pending before the Supreme Court decisions were handed
down. These courts have refused to apply the CRA even in cases where the CRA
merely restored the law to its position when the discrimination occurred and
when the complaint was filed. This result threatens judicial integrity. As Repre-
sentative Edwards predicted, without retroactive application, the federal courts
are handing down "two sets of contradictory decisions ' 32 2 and no end to the
dual line of cases is expected soon.
This anomalous result should be corrected. What the courts are unwilling to
do, Congress can do. Congress should pass legislation providing for retroactive
application of the CRA. This legislation will complete the goals of the CRA.
With it, the dead hand control exerted by the restrictive Supreme Court decisions
that the CRA sought to overturn will be laid to rest for good. With it, like cases
will be treated alike and victims of discrimination will be treated equally no
matter when the discrimination against them took place. Without it, victims of
discrimination will continue to go uncompensated. The need for retroactive
application is clear. The time to act is now.
Rose Mary Wummel*
322. See supra note 313.
* B.A., University of Michigan, 1990; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School,
1993.
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